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Introduction
Once a great wrong has been done, it never dies. People speak
the words of peace, but their hearts do not forgive. Generations
perform ceremonies of reconciliation but there is no end.
—Paule Marshall1
Desegregation is not and was never expected to be an easy task.
Racial attitudes ingrained in our Nation’s childhood and
adolescence are not quickly thrown aside in its middle years.
—Justice Thurgood Marshall2

These quotes from two Marshalls—one, a literary giant, and
the other, a legal one—highlight the power of collective memory and
racial bias to thwart remedial efforts eradicating discrimination.
Their lamentations about the difficulties of reconciliation have
modern-day application. For example, sixty-five years after the
Supreme Court’s monumental decision in Brown v. Board of
Education3 (Brown I), present-day commentators4 and even a

1. PAULE MARSHALL, Epigraph to THE CHOSEN PLACE, THE TIMELESS PEOPLE
(Vintage Contemporaries 1984) (1969).
2. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 814 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
3. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4. See, e.g., SHERYLL CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF INTEGRATION: HOW RACE AND
CLASS ARE UNDERMINING THE AMERICAN DREAM 208 (2004) (“[T]he idea and vision
animating Brown could not be farther from the reality of public education today.
Indeed, we are not even living up to the repugnant principle established in Plessy v.
Ferguson.”); Tomiko Brown-Nagin, An Historical Note on the Significance of the
Stigma Rationale for a Civil Rights Landmark, 48 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 991, 994 (2004)
(“Brown’s promise of quality, integrated schools has eluded most of its expected
beneficiaries.”); Jerry Rosiek, School Segregation: A Realist’s View, PHI DELTA
KAPPAN, Feb. 2019, at 8 (“[R]acial segregation has incrementally returned to U.S.
schools over the last 30 years.”).
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Supreme Court Justice5 almost unanimously conclude that Brown
I’s promise of educational equity is as elusive today as it was in
1954. This Article advances a theory about the elusiveness of Brown
I’s promise using the analytical framework of transitional justice.
Transitional justice is extraordinary justice triggered by transitions
from repressive political regimes characterized by massive human
rights violations to more democratic forms of government. 6 Once
triggered, it creates an imperative for comprehensive government
sanctioned remedial efforts, such as truth and reconciliation
commissions, to eradicate societal stereotypes and biases that
justified the massive human rights violations of the predecessor
regime.7
The Supreme Court’s decision in Brown I was the beginning of
a transitional period in American education. The shift from Jim
Crow segregation—a sociopolitical regime that nullified the
mandates of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments and their promise of full legal inclusion for Black
Americans—was no mundane political transition, but a radical,
paradigmatic one triggering transitional justice. However, despite
Brown I’s transitional character, the Court’s mandate to end
segregation “with all deliberate speed” announced in Brown v.
Board of Education8 (Brown II) and its judicially-fashioned remedy
of integration did little to describe, to account for, or to establish a
legal framework for correcting societal attitudes about Black
intellectual inferiority that spawned the adoption of segregation as
an educational policy.9 Consequently, American public schools
remain in transition. A perennially transitional system of public
education that burdens Black students with the yoke of an insidious
stereotype injures all students and threatens the egalitarian ideals
of public education. Consequently, extinguishing the stereotype of
Black intellectual inferiority in American education remains “a
long-ignored transitional justice project.”10
5. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 806
(2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“In light of the evident risk of a return to school
systems that are in fact (though not in law) resegregated, many school districts have
felt a need to maintain or to extend their integration efforts.”).
6. See discussion infra Part I.
7. See discussion infra Part I.
8. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
9. See discussion infra Parts II–IV.
10. Josie Foehrenbach Brown, Escaping the Circle by Confronting Classroom
Stereotyping: A Step Toward Equality in the Daily Educational Experience of
Children of Color, 6 AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y REP. 134, 137 (2004) [hereinafter
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Given transitional justice’s broad remedial focus, changing the
law without other efforts to rectify the psychic injuries inflicted by
stereotypes and biases leaves victimized communities without an
adequate remedy for government-sanctioned wrongdoing.11 Unlike
retributive justice with its focus on punishing individual offenders
or restorative justice with its focus on restoring relationships,
transitional justice has a much broader remedial focus: societal
transformation.12 To achieve social transformation, successor
political regimes adopt a comprehensive agenda of transitional
practices to address human rights violations, heal fragmented
societies, and regain the credibility of their citizens. 13 Scholars have
not traditionally applied transitional justice’s broad remedial scope
to established democracies, such as Australia, Canada, England,
New Zealand, and the United States. 14 Nevertheless, established

Foehrenbach Brown].
11. See discussion infra Section II.B.1.
12. COLLEEN MURPHY, THE CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE 8–10, 22–24, 83, 88–96 (2017); see also Fania Davis & Jonathan Scharrer,
Reimagining and Restoring Justice: Toward a Truth and Reconciliation Process to
Transform Violence Against African-Americans in the United States, in
TRANSFORMING JUSTICE, LAWYERS, AND THE PRACTICE OF LAW 89, 94, 97 (Marjorie
A. Silver ed., 2017) (discussing the differences between restorative and retributive
justice, and describing restorative justice as restoring harmony in fractured
relationships); Catherine O’Rourke, The Shifting Signifier of “Community” in
Transitional Justice: A Feminist Analysis, 23 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 269, 271,
282 (2008) (discussing generally the use of community-based transitional justice
mechanisms).
13. MURPHY, supra note 12, at 17, 35; see also Olivia Ensign, Speaking Truth to
Power: An Analysis of American Truth-Telling Efforts Vis-à-vis the South African
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 42 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE, 1, 2 (2018)
(discussing the various ways that societies use reconciliation in the aftermath of
conflict to regain social cohesion and rebuild interpersonal relationships); Matiangai
V. S. Sirleaf, The Truth About Truth Commissions: Why They Do Not Function
Optimally in Post-Conflict Societies, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 2263, 2265 (2014)
(discussing generally transitional justice mechanisms and noting the unique
characteristics of truth commissions).
14. MURPHY, supra note 12, at 31, 76–78; Davis & Scharrer, supra note 12, at 89,
108 n.69 (noting the traditional definition of transitional justice and disagreement
among scholars about whether its principles apply to societies not experiencing a
political transition but that are still fractured by long-standing and pervasive human
rights violations); Eric K. Yamamoto et al., Bridging the Chasm: Reconciliation’s
Needed Implementation Fourth Step, 15 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 109, 120–25 (2016)
(surveying transitional justice initiatives in established democracies); Joanna R.
Quinn, Whither the “Transition” of Transitional Justice?, 8 INTERDISC. J. HUM. RTS.
L. 63, 63–66, 75–78 (2015) (noting the traditional conception of transitional justice
as excluding democratic societies such as the United States and Canada but
discussing the expansion of transitional justice principles by various scholars
challenging the assumption that its principles are inapplicable to settled
democracies and the ensuing debate over the elasticity of the meaning of transition).
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democracies that remain fractured by long-standing, pervasive civil
rights violations against historically marginalized groups have
wholeheartedly endorsed transitional justice inspired initiatives.15
Despite the proliferation of these initiatives in other democratic
countries, the United States government has taken a piecemeal
approach to addressing its history of wrongdoing against Black
Americans and other historically marginalized communities,
relying on the rule of law as the exclusive vehicle for eradicating
stereotypes about Black intellectual inferiority. However,
connecting Black Americans’ quest for educational equity to the
larger struggle for international human rights will bring a fresh
perspective to contemporary discussions about the elusiveness of
Brown’s unfulfilled promises and equip education reformers with
an arsenal of transitional justice practices to tackle stereotypes of
Black intellectual inferiority at the root of systemic inequalities in
public education.
This Article builds upon prior applications of transitional
justice principles to the desegregation of the United States’ public
schools in two substantial ways. 16 First, it incorporates normative
understandings of transitional justice that have emerged since
these initial scholarly insights. Second, it substantiates the validity
of the comparison and then moves beyond theoretical
considerations to more practical applications. This Article proceeds
in four remaining parts. Part I outlines some central transitional
justice tenets and their modern-day application to stable
democracies. Part II argues that Brown I triggered the beginning of
15. Ensign, supra note 13, at 3, 42–44 (discussing various transitional justice
initiatives in the United States such as the Tuskegee Syphilis Study and the
Greensboro, North Carolina Truth and Reconciliation Commission and noting a
recent spike in grassroots models of truth-telling embracing transitional justice
principles in the United States); Heather Parker, Truth and Reconciliation
Commissions: A Needed Force in Alaska?, 34 ALASKA L. REV. 27, 29 (2017) (noting
the expansion of transitional justice initiatives to settled democracies such as the
United States to acknowledge slavery, racism, and the treatment of various minority
populations); Yamamoto et al., supra note 14, at 112; see also discussion infra Section
I.B (discussing other notable domestic transitional justice initiatives).
16. See Ensign, supra note 13, at 3 (noting that the Court’s decision in Brown I
“created a possibility for national dialogue and healing that never took place” but not
specifically linking the absence of dialogue to stereotypes of Black intellectual
inferiority or to the concept of transitional justice); Foehrenbach Brown, supra note
10, at 137–38 (describing the lack of efforts to extinguish the stereotype of Black
intellectual inferiority as a “long-ignored transitional justice project,” and discussing
the nation’s failure “to attend to the complicated details of transitional justice[,]” and
indicating that “neither the Supreme Court nor lower courts and education policy
makers charged with implementing [Brown] have devoted adequate attention to the
challenge of translating [Brown’s] legal norm into an operational reality”).
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a transitional period in American society and its system of public
education and then critiques the transitional deficiencies in the
Supreme Court’s desegregation jurisprudence. The last two sections
connect the past to the present. Part III discusses some of the
present-day educational consequences of these transitional
deficiencies, and the conclusion proposes a preliminary framework
acknowledging the legacy and dangers of racial stereotyping in
American education.17
I. Transitional Justice Primer: Central Tenets, Prevalent
Practices, and Modern-Day Applications
The
past
is
never
—William Faulkner18

dead.

It’s

not

even

past.

Transitional justice did not emerge as a remedial discipline
until decades after key sociopolitical flashpoints in American
history, such as slavery, reconstruction, and the beginning of Jim
Crow segregation.19 However, one of its central tenets—cultivating
a set of social values that will make the recurrence of massive
human rights violations virtually impossible 20—is endemic to
societies, such as the United States, that still struggle with racial
divisions caused by 250 years of slavery and 90 years of Jim Crow
segregation. Transitional justice has its origins in the unification of
post-World War II Europe and its more recent application to the
political upheavals in Latin America, Africa, and Eastern Europe
during the late 1980s and early 1990s after decades of repressive
communist rule and massive human rights violations. 21 In
transitional societies, the successor regime’s goal is to reconcile a
society deeply divided by the human rights atrocities committed by
the predecessor regime.22 Reconciliation is inextricably linked to
17. See discussion infra Part III. The broad outline of this initial framework will
be developed in this article, leaving a more detailed analysis to a subsequent article.
18. WILLIAM FAULKNER, REQUIEM FOR A NUN 92 (1951).
19. See discussion infra Section I.A (attributing the field transitional justice to
New York Law School Professor Ruti Teitel).
20. See James L. Gibson, Truth, Reconciliation, and the Creation of a Human
Rights Culture in South Africa, 38 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 5, 5 (2004) (discussing the
reconciliatory goals of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Committee).
21. Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice Genealogy, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 69, 76
(2003) (describing various phases of transitional justice).
22. RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 5 (2002) (describing transitional
justice as broader than political revolution and as “a shift in political orders”); What
is Transitional Justice?, INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUST. (Apr. 25, 2011),
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societal transformation.23 According to noted transitional justice
scholar Colleen Murphy, societal transformation is rooted in
relationships and it demands a radical overhaul of the basic terms
of interaction between citizens, officials, and institutions so that
such relationships are no longer structurally unequal. 24 Eric
Yamamoto, another noted transitional justice scholar, also
emphasizes the relational aspect of reconciliation, remarking that
“[i]n practice, repairing the breach—or reconciling—means salving
psychological and economic wounds by lifting barriers to liberty and
equality in education, housing, medical care, employment, cultural
preservation, and political governance.”25 A major obstacle to
societal transformation is pervasive structural inequality which
Murphy defines as “the ways in which life prospects for individuals
are fundamentally shaped by the institutional rules and norms that
govern a society and that shape and constrain individual action.” 26
Given the relational aspect of reconciliation, societal
transformation hinges on the successor regime’s ability to use
memory, narrative, and historical accounting to rebuild a shared
societal consensus that forms the foundation of a new government. 27
To rebuild societal consensus, the government assumes the
responsibility for shaping a national, collective memory of past
political repression to discredit the stereotypes, assumptions, and
ancient feuds that created the social context that tolerated
widespread human rights violations. 28 Consequently, in
transitional societies, memory, narrative, and historical accounting
are uniquely political ways to regain public trust in a highly
fractured society and legitimize the successor regime. 29 Transitional
justice scholars have identified several practices that facilitate
societal transformation.30 Common examples include transitional
https://www.ictj.org/publication/what-transitional-justice [https://perma.cc/4NE2-V
CQP] (defining transitional justice as “a response to systematic or widespread
violations of human rights” that “seeks recognition for victims and promotion of
possibilities for peace, reconciliation and democracy”).
23. MURPHY, supra note 12, at 6, 11; TEITEL, supra note 22, at 6.
24. MURPHY, supra note 12, at 81, 119, 121, 160.
25. Yamamoto et al., supra note 14, at 142.
26. MURPHY, supra note 12, at 43, 45.
27. TEITEL, supra note 22, at 5, 8 (discussing the important transitional roles
that historical inquiry and narrative play in the workings of historical justice).
28. Id. at 69–71 (explaining that the foci of shared judgment that form the basis
for a new social consensus are expected to emerge through historical accountings and
the pivotal role law plays in shaping social memory).
29. Id. at 70.
30. See Foehrenbach Brown, supra note 10, at 137 (categorizing transitional
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legal rules, criminal prosecutions, truth and reconciliation
commissions, reparations, apologies, and museums. 31 This section
briefly outlines some of the most prevalent transitional justice
practices and then explores the expansion of transitional justice
principles to stable democracies.
A. Transitional Justice Tenets and Prevalent Practices
Developing and altering previously existing legal rules is a
rudimentary transitional justice practice.32 Ruti Teitel, a
preeminent scholar who authored one of the first published
accounts of transitional justice, observed that “[i]n transition, the
oft-shared [societal] frameworks—political, religious, social—are
threatened; so it is the law, its framework and processes that in
great part shapes collective memory.”33 To transform society,
transitional legal rules assume a dualistic character that is
simultaneously retrospective and prospective.34 Transitional legal
rules are retrospective because they supply the requisite social
context to dismantle laws that the predecessor regime enacted that
either facilitated or tolerated human rights abuses. 35 Transitional
legal rules are also prospective because, in addition to repudiating
these laws, they justify a new political order.36 This new political
order is communicated to the public through transitional narratives
embedded in judicial opinions and legislative initiatives that
denounce the stereotypes, assumptions, and ancient feuds that led
to widespread human rights abuses. 37 Consequently, transitional
legal rules are revolutionary; they eradicate previously established
precedent, and, according to Teitel, are formulated “in politically
justice mechanisms into the following categories: “assessment of responsibility for
past wrongs, the assembly of a comprehensive historical account of past injustices,
the implementation of mechanisms to repair past wrongs, and the development of a
workable governmental order and legal framework that reconstitutes the relevant
community on just terms”); What is Transitional Justice?, supra note 22.
31. Sirleaf, supra note 13, at 2265 (discussing generally transitional justice
mechanisms).
32. MURPHY, supra note 12, at 124.
33. TEITEL, supra note 22, at 71.
34. Id. at 11 (“There is a tension between the rule of law in transition as
backward-looking and forward-looking, as settled versus dynamic.”).
35. See id. (describing the law in transitional times as a mediator or conduit from
a system of illiberal rule to a new social order that is primarily democratic).
36. See id.
37. Id. at 70–71 (“Transitional historical narratives are produced through
varying legal measures, such as the trials of the ancien[t] regimes, or bureaucratic
bodies convened for these purposes, and still other legal responses that imply
marshaling a factual predicate.”).
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controversial areas, where the value of legal change is in tension
with the value of adherence to the principle of settled legal
precedent.”38 Due to the controversial nature of transformative
legal rules, judges in transitional societies embrace a kind of
activism that they might avoid in non-transitional periods.39
Although cultivating transitional legal rules is often the first
step toward societal transformation, truth and reconciliation
commissions (TRCs) have emerged as the dominant transitional
justice practice among contemporary transitional societies.40 TRCs
are autonomous, non-judicial, and non-retributive bodies that
investigate past human rights abuses and identify patterns of
interaction among citizens and societal institutions that promoted
the human rights abuses of the predecessor government. 41 The 1995
South African Truth and Reconciliation Committee (SATRC) is the
most famous example of a government-sponsored TRC.42 Headed by
Archbishop Desmond Tutu, the SATRC sought to bear witness to
human rights violations, record the testimonials of victims, and in
some cases, grant amnesty to perpetrators.43 When it was convened,
the SATRC was the largest truth-telling initiative of its kind,
resulting in more than 300 staff members, an annual budget of $18
million, and a 7-year investigatory scope.44 The SATRC took the
testimony of approximately 21,000 victims, received 7,112 amnesty
applications, and granted amnesty in 849 cases. 45 The SATRC was
premised on historical accounting, the idea that societal
transformation is facilitated by forgiveness, and reconciliation
through truth-telling.46 However, the truth proclaimed by the
38. Id. at 11.
39. Id. at 23–24.
40. See Patryk Labuda, Racial Reconciliation in Mississippi: An Evaluation of
the Proposal to Establish a Mississippi Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 27
HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 1, 30 (2011) (suggesting that disillusionment with
criminal prosecution has resulted in the proliferation of truth-telling initiatives);
Sirleaf, supra note 13, at 2266–67.
41. MURPHY, supra note 12, at 11; Labuda, supra note 40, at 17.
42. Ensign, supra note 13, at 2; Parker, supra note 15, at 28; Sirleaf, supra note
13, at 2287.
43. See Parker, supra note 15, at 42–43.
44. Rita Lenane, “It Doesn’t Seem Very Fair, Because We Were Here First”:
Resolving the Sioux Nation Black Hills Land Dispute and the Potential for
Restorative Justice to Facilitate Government-to-Government Negotiations, 16
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 651, 676 (2015).
45. Truth Commission: South Africa, U.S. INST. PEACE, http://www.usip.org/pub
lications/1995/12/truth-commission-south-africa [https://perma.cc/SE7X-AC4E].
46. Deborah Posel & Graeme Simpson, The Power of Truth: South Africa’s Truth
and Reconciliation Commission in Context, in COMMISSIONING THE PAST:
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SATRC was, according to some critics, a socially constructed,
bargained-for political exchange that sacrificed peace for justice. 47
Others criticized the absence of a reconciliatory framework and
mechanisms for following up on the commission’s reparative
directives.48 However, despite its critics, the SATRC is the
paradigmatic transitional justice truth-telling initiative because of
its carefully constructed methodology,49 comprehensive final report,
and the clarity with which it defined truth.50 Sixty-eight countries,
including South Korea (2000 and 2005), the Democratic Republic of
Congo (2003), Ecuador (2007), Kenya (2008), the Solomon Islands
(2008), and Honduras (2009) have modeled their truth-telling
initiatives on the SATRC.51
B. Applying Transitional Justice Principles to Stable
Democracies
Transitional justice inspired initiatives have become popular
in stable democracies, such as Canada and the United States.
However, unlike the Canadian government, which has explicitly
endorsed transitional justice inspired initiatives, 52 the United
UNDERSTANDING SOUTH AFRICA’S TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION 1, 10–
11 (2002).
47. See TEITEL, supra note 22, at 88–89 (providing a general critique of SATRC
as brokering peace for the sake of political expediency and presenting a version of
human rights atrocities that was more about political consensus than truth); Ensign,
supra note 13, at 6 (noting perceived flaws such as the disproportionate
representation of White South Africans and the Amnesty Committee’s acceptance of
the perpetrators’ version of events, even when they contradicted the victims’
accounts); Labuda, supra note 40, at 30 (“In highlighting the identity of perpetrators
while obscuring that of beneficiaries, the [SATRC created] a version of the truth
which obscures the link between perpetrators and beneficiaries, and thus between
racialised power and racialised privilege.”); Teitel, supra note 21, at 83.
48. See Yamamoto, et al., supra note 14, at 111 (summarizing some of the most
salient critiques of the SATRC).
49. Labuda, supra note 40, at 2–3.
50. Ensign, supra note 13, at 1–8 (distinguishing between the four distinctive
kinds of truth promulgated by the SATRC); see also Yamamoto et al., supra note 14,
at 140 (describing the SATRC as a template for subsequent truth-telling initiatives
because of the clarity of its moral imperatives, its structure, and its deployment of
language and imagery to build a common ground for groundbreaking political
action).
51. Sirleaf, supra note 13, at 2331 (citing TRICIA D. OLSEN ET AL., TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE IN BALANCE: COMPARING PROCESSES, WEIGHING EFFICACY 39 (2010)).
52. See Parker, supra note 15, at 53–57 (summarizing the work of the Canadian
Truth and Reconciliation Commission); Statement of Apology to Former Students of
Indian Residential Schools, GOV’T CAN. (June 11, 2008), http://www.aadncaandc.gc.ca/DAM/DAM-INTER-HQ/STAGING/texte-text/rqpi_apo_pdf_132216734
7706_eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/JC5S-6QVA].
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States government has taken an ambivalent, piecemeal approach to
addressing government-sanctioned wrongdoing that normalized
physical violence against Indigenous peoples and those of African
descent and the psychological, cultural, and educational
ramifications of that violence.53 Although not explicitly invoking the
transitional
justice
moniker,
these
federally-endorsed
reconciliatory initiatives can be easily summarized: (1) delayed,
conditional apologies to Blacks for lynchings during the early
twentieth century and for the atrocities of slavery and
segregation,54 to Native Hawaiians for a government-endorsed coup
of the sovereign Kingdom of Hawaii, 55 and to Native Americans for
decades of violence, theft, and mismanagement of tribal lands, 56 (2)
a National Museum of African-American History and Culture
authorized by Congress after more than 100 years of private sector
lobbying,57 (3) reparation payments to Japanese-American
survivors of World War II internment camps, 58 but the denial of
53. See Yamamoto et al., supra note 14 (denoting the large reconciliation
chasm that still must be bridged in the United States); Kaimipono David Wenger,
Apology Lite: Truths, Doubts, and Reconciliations in the Senate’s Guarded Apology
for Slavery, 42 CONN. L. REV. CONTEMPLATIONS 1, 1 (2009) (discussing the lackluster
approach the United States has to public apologies).
54. Yamamoto et al., supra note 14, at 121; see also Wenger, supra note 53
(noting criticism about the Senate’s apology some 144 years after the end of the Civil
War and 41 years after the end of Jim Crow and its inclusion of a conspicuous
disclaimer clearly foreclosing a right to reparations for slavery).
55. Danny Lewis, Five Times the United States Officially Apologized,
SMITHSONIAN MAG. (May 27, 2016), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smartnews/five-times-united-states-officially-apologized-180959254/ [https://perma.cc/C5
H9-G94W]. In January 1893, a group of American sugar magnates staged a
government-endorsed coup, forcing Hawaiian Queen Lili’uokalani to abdicate and
dissolve the Kingdom of Hawaii. Id. The dissolution was the precursor to Hawaii’s
formal annexation by the United States government. Id. One hundred years later on
November 23, 1993, Congress issued a joint resolution formally apologizing to the
people of Hawaii. Id.
56. Ann Piccard, Death by Boarding School: “The Last Acceptable Racism” and
the United States’ Genocide of Native Americans, 49 GONZ. L. REV. 137, 165–66 (2013)
(discussing the Senate’s apology to Native Americans that was buried in a 2010
Department of Defense Appropriations Act); see also Rob Capriccioso, A Sorry Saga:
Obama Signs Native American Apology Resolution; Fails to Draw Attention to It,
INDIAN L. RESOURCE CTR. (Jan. 13, 2010), http://indianlaw.org/node/529 [https://per
ma.cc/FS2V-EUUS] (reporting on an apology given by President Obama to Native
Americans in the United States that was not highlighted by the administration).
57. See Wesley Yiin, Timeline: It Took Over 100 Years for the African American
Museum to Become a Reality, WASH. POST (Sept. 22, 2016), https://www.washi
ngtonpost.com/entertainment/museums/timeline-it-took-over-100-years-for-the-afri
can-american-museum-to-become-a-reality/2016/09/20/dc080c54-5a8c-11e6-831d0324760ca856_story.html [https://perma.cc/MLT8-FT5S].
58. Kim D. Chanbonpin, “We Don’t Want Dollars, Just Change”: Narrative
Counter-Terrorism Strategy, an Inclusive Model for Social Healing, and the Truth
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reparations to Blacks for 250 years of slavery and 90 years of Jim
Crow segregation and to Native Americans for the depletion of 96%
of their population,59 (4) two federal prosecutions, delayed
investigations,60 and symbolic legislative efforts in response to the
murders of Black Americans after the Brown decisions,61 and (5) a
truth-telling initiative redressing wrongdoing against Black male
participants in the longest nontherapeutic experiment on human
beings in medical history,62 but a tacit rejection of pleas from
About the Torture Commission, 6 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 1, 25–29 (2011) [hereinafter
We Don’t Want Dollars] (briefly summarizing the quest for reparations in the United
States). In 1988, Congress authorized a $20,000 reparation payment for the
survivors of the federal government’s forced internment of Japanese-Americans
during World War II. Id. See generally Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Case for Reparations,
ATLANTIC, June 2014, at 54 (making the argument that the United States
government should give reparations to African American people).
59. MAINE WABANAKI-STATE CHILD WELFARE TRUTH & RECONCILIATION
COMM’N, BEYOND THE MANDATE: CONTINUING THE CONVERSATION 63 (2015),
http://www.mainewabanakitrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/TRC-Report-Expan
ded_July2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/XK9M-METM].
60. See Labuda, supra note 40, at 7–13 (discussing state and federal prosecutions
beginning in the early 1990s and extending into the early 2000s for Jim Crow Era
murders). The most well-known of these federally-endorsed reconciliatory initiatives
are the criminal investigations and prosecutions for the murders of Black Americans
resulting from the massive resistance to the Brown decisions that began in the late
1980s, well after the deaths of some culpable parties. Id.; S. Willoughby Anderson,
The Past on Trial: Birmingham, the Bombing, and Restorative Justice, 96 CALIF. L.
REV. 471, 471 (2008) (“Since 1989, state and national law enforcement authorities
have reopened or begun investigations into at least eighteen civil rights-era murders
across the South.”).
61. Maureen Johnson, Separate but (Un)Equal: Why Institutionalized AntiRacism Is the Answer to the Never-Ending Cycle of Plessy v. Ferguson, 52 U. RICH.
L. REV. 327, 361–62 (2018); see also DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S
SEVENTH ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS PURSUANT TO THE EMMETT TILL UNSOLVED
CIVIL RIGHTS CRIME ACT OF 2007 AND FIRST ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS
PURSUANT TO THE EMMETT TILL UNSOLVED CIVIL RIGHTS CRIMES REAUTHORIZATION
ACT OF 2016 22–25 (2018) (enumerating an extensive list of Black Americans who
were victims of racialized violence); Barbara A. Schwabauer, The Emmett Till
Unsolved Civil Rights Crime Act: The Cold Case of Racism in the Criminal Justice
System, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 653, 656 (2010) (explaining the history and impact of the
Emmett Till Unsolved Civil Rights Crime Act); Ronald Turner, Plessy 2.0, 13 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REV. 861, 889 (2009) (discussing what he describes as the “murder[s],
bombings, beatings, and castrations of those fighting for and seeking relief from the
entrenched and enervating system of racial caste and hierarchy”).
62. Tuskegee Syphilis Study Legacy Comm., Bad Blood: The Tuskegee Syphilis
Study in Macon County, Alabama—1932–1972, U. VA.: HIST. COLLECTIONS CLAUDE
MOORE HEALTH SCI. LIBR. (May 1996), http://exhibits.hsl.virginia.edu/badblood
[https://perma.cc/83TM-3TPC]. The forty-year study known as the Tuskegee Study
of Untreated Syphilis in the Negro Male withheld treatment for a lethal, highlycontagious disease from hundreds of Black men in the rural South. Id.; see also
Ensign, supra note 13, at 8–20 (discussing the final report of the Tuskegee Syphilis
Study Ad Hoc Advisory Panel commissioned in 1973 by the United States
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare).
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legislators,63 scholars, and community-based advocacy groups to
launch more comprehensive federally-funded reconciliatory
initiatives.64 Furthermore, no federally-endorsed reconciliatory
initiatives have comprehensively examined the intergenerational
trauma caused by decades of segregation as an educational policy,
integration’s failure to debunk stereotypes of Black intellectual
inferiority, or the modern-day consequences of these reconciliatory
failures.65
In the absence of federally-endorsed reconciliatory initiatives,
educational institutions, corporations, states, and non-profit
organizations have launched more comprehensive reconciliatory
63. See Donna Owens, Veteran Congressman Still Pushing for Reparations in a
Divided America, NBC NEWS (Feb. 20, 2017, 2:18 AM), http://www.nbcnews
.com/news/nbcblk/rep-john-conyers-still-pushing-reparations-divided-american723151 [https://perma.cc/94F8-SDZC]. Every year since 1989 until his resignation
in 2017, Congressman John Conyers of Michigan proposed legislation
to acknowledge the fundamental injustice, cruelty, brutality, and
inhumanity of slavery in the United States and the 13 American colonies
between 1619 and 1865 and to establish a commission to examine the
institution of slavery, subsequent de jure and de facto racial and economic
discrimination against African Americans, and the impact of these forces on
living African Americans, to make recommendations to the Congress on
appropriate remedies, and for other purposes.
RANDALL ROBINSON, THE DEBT: WHAT AMERICA OWES TO BLACKS 201 (2001) (quoting
Commission to Study Reparation Proposals for African-Americans Act, H.R. 40, 103d
Cong. (1993)). After Congressman Conyers’s retirement, Congressman Sheila
Jackson Lee sponsored the bill. See Commission to Study and Develop Reparation
Proposals for African-Americans Act, H.R. 40, 116th Cong. (2019). On June 19, 2019,
Congress recognized Congressman Conyers and Lee’s legislative efforts and held a
hearing on the subject of reparations for the descendants of slaves in the United
States. See P.R. Lockhart, America Is Having an Unprecedented Debate About
Reparations. What Comes Next?, VOX (June 20, 2019, 3:30 PM) https://www.
vox.com/identities/2019/6/20/18692949/congress-reparations-slavery discriminationhr-40-coates-glover [https://perma.cc/Z8NL-WUK4] [hereinafter Debate About
Reparations].
64. See, e.g., Ensign, supra note 13, at 3 (“[T]he United States has never
established a formal truth and reconciliation commission, despite its entrenched
history of human rights abuses against Black Americans.”); Parker, supra note 15,
at 35–42 (advocating for the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission
to address state-sanctioned wrongdoing against the Alaskan Native population);
Erika Wilson, The Great American Dilemma: Law and the Intransigence of Racism,
20 CUNY L. REV. 513, 519 (2017) (discussing the community-based transitional
justice inspired initiatives in Greensboro, North Carolina but noting the absence of
“a country-wide comprehensive attempt at Truth and Reconciliation around
America’s history of slavery and discrimination”); Margaret M. Russell, Reopening
the Emmett Till Case: Lessons and Challenges for Critical Race Practice, 73
FORDHAM L. REV. 2101, 2113 (2005) (discussing unhealed wounds in American
society in conjunction with efforts to launch a truth and reconciliation commission
for lynching).
65. See CASHIN, supra note 4, at IX–XXII (discussing the failure of integration in
the United States and its effects).
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agendas that include apologies, the removal of confederate imagery,
and truth-telling initiatives. Georgetown University,66 Brown
University, the Southern Baptist Seminary, 67 and private sector
businesses, such as Wachovia, Aetna, Lehman Brothers, and J.P.
Morgan, have apologized for perpetuating and financially
benefitting from slavery.68 Furthermore, beginning in the 1990s
and continuing into the early 2000s, several Southern states
apologized for slavery69 and removed confederate imagery from
official government buildings, property, and schools.70 Other
Southern states and cities endorsed truth-telling initiatives
acknowledging the intergenerational trauma caused by raciallymotivated massacres of the early Jim Crow era. Notable examples
include the Tulsa Race Riots Commission,71 Florida’s Historical
Commission for the Rosewood Massacre, 72 and the Wilmington Race
66. See Alexa Lardieri, Georgetown Students Vote for Reparations for Slave
Descendants, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.
usnews.com/news/education-news/articles/2019-04-12/georgetown-students-votefor-reparations-for-descendants-of-slaves [https://perma.cc/V42R-VWNG].
67. See Tom Gjelten, Southern Baptist Seminary Confronts History of
Slaveholding and ‘Deep Racism’, NPR (Dec. 13, 2018, 10:02 AM), http://www.npr.or
g/2018/12/13/676333342/southern-baptist-seminary-confronts-history-of-slaveholdi
ng-and-deep-racism [https://perma.cc/5SG4-TR3H].
68. Yamamoto et al., supra note 14, at 121–22 (identifying a list of major United
States corporations that have apologized for the financial benefits incurred from
slavery); Should the US Pay Reparations to Black Americans?, PBS: POINT TAKEN
(May 10, 2016), https://www.pbs.org/video/point-taken-should-us-pay-reparationsblack-americans/#intro [https://perma.cc/5CDS-X53L].
69. See Yamamoto et al., supra note 14, at 120–21 n.42 (outlining legislative
efforts in Florida, Maryland, North Carolina, Alabama, and Virginia).
70. See generally James Shockley, Farewell to Dixie: California’s Attempt to
Eliminate the Confederacy from Public Schools, 45 J.L. & EDUC. 127 (2016)
(examining California’s attempt to pass a law eliminating Confederate names from
being used to name public schools); Allison M. Mosig, Hate or Civic Pride? The Speech
of Symbols in the United States, Germany and Japan, 40 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L.
REV. 73 (2017) (discussing the question of how to deal with the Confederate Flag in
the United States through the lenses of Japanese and German policy concerning
Nazi symbols and the Rising Sun Flag).
71. Tulsa Race Massacre, HIST., https://www.history.com/topics/roaring-twentie
s/tulsa-race-massacre [https://perma.cc/228A-LLJY]. The Tulsa Race Riots
Commission was established in 2000 by the State of Oklahoma to acknowledge what
has been described as one of the most violent racial clashes in American history. Id.
The Commission’s report found that approximately 100 to 300 people lost their lives
during the riot and that more than 8,000 people were made homeless. Id. This
eighteen-hour-long massacre against the Greenwood community, home to a
prosperous business district known as the Black Wall Street, was precipitated by a
false newspaper report that Black World War I veterans were planning a massive
armed revolt to prevent the lynching of a Black man falsely accused of sexually
assaulting a White woman. Id.
72. See generally Alfred L. Brophy, Reconsidering Reparations, 81 IND. L.J. 811,
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Riot Commission.73 Several grassroots community organizations
have also launched truth-telling initiatives redressing modern-day
social justice issues that stem from the repression of Jim Crow
segregation. The Mississippi Truth Telling Commission,
established in 2008, is the most ambitious of these grassroots
efforts, declaring its intent to become the first state-wide truth
commission in United States history to comprehensively examine
segregation in Mississippi and its modern-day consequences.74
Other notable examples include the Greensboro Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, the first grassroots community-based
TRC, established in 2004 to investigate the 1979 murder of five
Black demonstrators by Klansmen and members of the American
Nazi Party,75 the Illinois Torture Inquiry and Relief Commission
established in 2009 to provide legal redress for victims tortured by
the Chicago Police Department,76 and the Metro Detroit Truth and
Reconciliation Commission established in 2011 to examine the
impact of institutional racism in Metropolitan Detroit. 77
However, only a few transitional justice inspired initiatives
have acknowledged the intergenerational psychological trauma
caused by Jim Crow segregation or by violent resistance to school
820–22 (2006) (discussing the Florida legislative mandate that led to a Commission
investigating the Rosewood massacre). Rosewood was the only state-endorsed truthtelling initiative that resulted in an apology and an award of reparations of $2.1
million to be divided among the Rosewood survivors and their descendants. Id.; C.
Jeanne Bassett, House Bill 591: Florida Compensates Rosewood Victims and Their
Families for a Seventy-One-Year-Old Injury, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 503, 503 (1994).
73. See 1898 WILMINGTON RACE RIOT COMM’N, 1898 WILMINGTON RACE RIOT
REPORT (2006), https://digital.ncdcr.gov/digital/collection/p249901coll22/id/5842 [htt
ps://perma.cc/3HVA-BLUY]. In 2000, the North Carolina General Assembly
established the commission. Id. at 11. The culmination of the commission’s work was
a 500-page report that was published on May 31, 2006. Id. at 1.
74. See Labuda, supra note 40, at 19–23 (discussing comprehensively the
commission’s goals and mandates); Mississippi Truth Project, VIMEO,
https://vimeo.com/mstruthproject [https://perma.cc/LA5L-WDLA].
75. See Ensign, supra note 13, at 20–37 (discussing comprehensively the origins
and impact of the Greensboro Truth and Reconciliation Commission); Parker, supra
note 15, at 58–60.
76. See Vickie Casanova Willis & Standish E. Willis, Black People Against Police
Torture: The Importance of Building a People-Centered Human Rights Movement, 21
PUB. INT. L. REP. 235, 247–48 (2015) (discussing comprehensively the Illinois Torture
Inquiry and Relief Commission’s origins and impact); Kim D. Chanbonpin, Truth
Stories: Credibility Determinations at the Illinois Torture Inquiry and Relief
Commission, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1085, 1088–91 (2014) (same).
77. See Parker, supra note 15, at 60 (discussing the commission’s formation and
organizational struggles); The Metropolitan Detroit Truth & Reconciliation
Commission, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/metrodetroittruth [https://perma.
cc/5QAP-N8E9].
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desegregation. Scholars have begun studying the impact of
intergenerational trauma, finding evidence “that repressing
feelings associated with acts of [W]hite racism may be
psychologically damaging and lay the foundation for future mental
health problems and behaviors symptomatic of post-traumatic
stress syndrome.”78 Dr. Joy DeGruy, a noted scholar on the
intergenerational psychological effects of slavery and segregation,
notes that “[r]ecent research in the field of epigenetics has revealed
that trauma can actually impact an individual’s DNA, and the
manifestations of the traumas experienced by prior generations can
be passed along genetically to future offspring.” 79 Inspired by
empirical evidence about the impact of intergenerational trauma,
grassroots community organizations, universities, and museums
have launched healing initiatives to create public awareness about
its impact in the Black community. To redress the intergenerational
psychological trauma of de jure segregation, community-based
organizations in Minneapolis, Minnesota and Bridgeport and New
Haven, Connecticut offer community healing workshops that
encourage participants to use music, prayer, and poetry as conduits
for emotional healing.80 Universities have endorsed cross-racial
healing initiatives that foster candid and constructive
conversations about race and the unfortunate legacy of Jim Crow
era segregation.81 The most notable of these university-sponsored
reconciliatory initiatives is the William Winter Institute for Racial
Reconciliation, which started at the University of Mississippi.82 The
Welcome Table is the Winter Institute’s flagship healing initiative;
78. Alma Carten, How the Legacy of Slavery Affects the Mental Health of Black
Americans Today, CONVERSATION (July 27, 2015), https://theconversation.com/howthe-legacy-of-slavery-affects-the-mental-health-of-black-americans-today-44642
[https://perma.cc/D8U4-TTVC]; see also JOY DEGRUY, POST TRAUMATIC SLAVE
SYNDROME: AMERICA’S LEGACY OF ENDURING INJURY AND HEALING 13–15, 100–05
(2005) (describing the author’s theory of post traumatic slave syndrome and
associated patterns of behavior).
79. See Adilifu Fundi, 6: “Post Traumatic Slave Syndrome”—Jay-Z and Kanye
“Behavior” Fully Explained, RENAISSANCE MAN (May 15, 2019), https://renaissance
manjam.wordpress.com/ [https://perma.cc/L2D9-DPPV] (quoting Joy DeGruy); see
also DEGRUY, supra note 78, at 124.
80. See Enola G. Aird, Toward a Renaissance for the African-American Family:
Confronting the Lie of Black Inferiority, 58 EMORY L.J. 7, 18 (2008); Vision and
Mission, CMTY. HEALING NETWORK, https://www.communityhealingnet.org/visionmission/ [https://perma.cc/C4VH-WTZH].
81. See, e.g., Office of Diversity and Inclusion: South Carolina Collaborative for
Race and Reconciliation, U.S.C., http://sc.edu/about/offices_and_divisions/diversity_
and_inclusion/race_reconciliation/index.php [https://perma.cc/8GHC-ATTG].
82. See About the William Winter Institute, WINTER INST., https://www.winterin
stitute.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/69PB-WJJU].
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it consists of a series of interactive conversations that equip people
from diverse racial and cultural backgrounds with the capacity to
have difficult conversations about race.83 The Welcome Table has
become a model for other universities and non-profit community
organizations interested in launching community healing
initiatives. In 2017, the University of South Carolina launched
Welcome Table SC, a series of cross-racial conversations modeled
on the Welcome Table program.84 Welcome Table dialogues also
inspired the creation of the Emmett Till Interpretive Center which
is housed in the courthouse where the infamous trial of Till’s
murderers occurred.85
Similar
transitional
justice
inspired
initiatives
commemorating forgotten aspects of Jim Crow segregation through
the innovative use of storytelling, interactive media, and visual arts
have become popular in several Southern states. In 2018, Equal
Justice Initiative launched the National Memorial for Peace and
Justice in Montgomery, Alabama, the first national memorial
honoring the thousands of Black men, women, and children who
“were hanged, burned alive, shot, drowned, and beaten to death by
[W]hite mobs between 1877 and 1950.”86 The museum’s political
message is communicated through an interactive, visual design
that forces visitors to empathize with victims and thus gain an
unparalleled understanding of the heinousness of the racial
terrorism endemic to Jim Crow segregation.87 Museum visitors are
confronted with 800 6-foot-tall suspended steel blocks.88 Each block
represents a county where racial killings occurred, and “[a]s you
walk through the memorial, the orientation of the hanging
monuments changes from eye level to overhead, evoking the way
many lynching victims were hanged, often in public spaces.” 89 Jars
83. The Welcome Table, WINTER INST., http://winterinstitute.org/communitybuilding/the-welcome-table [https://perma.cc/ENA7-M553].
84. See Office of Diversity and Inclusion: Welcome Table SC, U.S.C.,
https://sc.edu/about/offices_and_divisions/diversity_and_inclusion/race_reconciliatio
n/welcome_table_sc/index.php [https://perma.cc/QWG9-YXUN].
85. Video of Our Story, EMMETT TILL INTERPRETIVE CTR., http://www.emmetttill.org/ [https://perma.cc/T24Z-4EZ6].
86. Museum and Memorial Homepage, EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE,
http://museumandmemorial.eji.org/ [https://perma.cc/36CY-N472].
87. Id.
88. Debbie Elliott, New Lynching Memorial Is a Space ‘To Talk About All of That
Anguish’, NPR (Apr. 26, 2018, 5:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/2018/04/26/604271871/
new-lynching-memorial-is-a-space-to-talk-about-all-of-that-anguish [https://perma.c
c/YS8E-Y7QZ].
89. Id.
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of soil gathered from documented lynching sites and other sites of
racially-motivated murders commemorate the victims. 90 Another
distinctive feature of the memorial’s counterpart, the Legacy
Museum, is the way that its organizers encourage racial
reconciliation in a manner that connects the past to the present.91
Officials from counties where the lynchings occurred are
encouraged to take replicas of the steel blocks back to their
communities and create local memorials that invite community
dialogue.92
Other reconciliatory initiatives have explored the
intergenerational psychosocial trauma caused by violent resistance
to school desegregation. In 2011, the Union of Minority
Neighborhoods, a Boston grassroots community organization,
launched the Boston Busing/Desegregation Project (BBDP), a citywide effort to redress one of the nation’s most overt, violent
responses to the Brown cases’ mandate to desegregate.93 The BBDP
began its innovative work in 2011 with the screening of its film, Can
We Talk?—Learning from Boston’s Busing/Desegregation Crisis.94
A crucial mandate of its organizers is to honor the experiences of
those who lived through the crisis by addressing a pivotal moment
in Boston’s history, one that continues to negatively impact the
educational success of Boston students. 95 The BBDP implements its
mandate through screenings of the film, presentations, oral
histories, and detailed reports that facilitate empowerment and
community action through access to a more nuanced portrait of this
pivotal era that goes beyond “simplified sound bites . . . that the
crisis was a failed social experiment or the cause of [W]hite flight or
middle class flight from public schools.” 96 Another equally
90. Erica Wright, Citizen-Led Coalition Uncovers History of Lynching in Jeffco,
BIRMINGHAM TIMES (Mar. 7, 2019), http://www.birminghamtimes.com/2019/03/citi
zen-led-coalition-uncovers-history-of-lynching-in-jeffco/ [https://perma.cc/WSS9-X5L
V].
91. Elliott, supra note 88 (noting the “direct line from slavery to lynching and to
issues the country faces today, including mass incarceration”).
92. Wright, supra note 90; Elliott, supra note 88.
93. About the Boston Busing/Desegregation Project, NE. UNIV., http://bpsdesegr
egation.library.northeastern.edu/about-the-boston-busing-desegregation-project/
[https://perma.cc/RDE8-V9R8].
94. See id.
95. See THE BOSTON BUSING/DESEGREGATION PROJECT, UNFINISHED BUSINESS:
7 QUESTIONS 7 LESSONS 1–2 (2014), https://bpsdesegregation.library.northeastern.e
du/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/7-lessons-bbdp-9-11-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y8D2KCUF].
96. Id. at 2 (emphasis removed); About the Boston Busing/Desegregation Project,
supra note 93.
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important goal is what its organizers describe as exploring and
acknowledging the intergenerational trauma surrounding the crisis
and repudiating a national memory of the crisis that “minimizes
and excludes the stories of many communities . . . in order to gain a
systemic understanding of the era for the diversity of people, then
and now, whose interests converge around wanting equity, access,
and excellence for all.”97
These domestic transitional justice inspired initiatives
launched by the diverse group of public and private stakeholders
have acknowledged the intergenerational impact of Jim Crow
segregation and created awareness about the various ways in which
federal, state, and local governments were complicit in endorsing
normalized collective wrongdoing and human rights violations
rooted in White supremacy. However, even these more
comprehensive transitional justice inspired initiatives cannot
compensate for the absence of comprehensive federally-endorsed
reconciliatory initiatives for many of the reasons outlined by
transitional justice scholars, such as inadequate financial resources
and a disengaged public, that denies the absence of a larger political
and communal context for government-sanctioned human rights
abuses.98 And consequently, reconciliation remains an elusive
though potent goal for Black Americans.

97. THE BOSTON BUSING/DESEGREGATION PROJECT, REPORT ON PHASE ONE 5
(2012), http://bpsdesegregation.library.northeastern.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/0
1/BBDP-Year-One-Report-10.5.12.pdf [https://perma.cc/7UEH-2WNB] [hereinafter
BOSTON BUSING/DESEGREGATION PROJECT].
98. See Parker, supra note 15, at 32–33 (discussing generally the limitations of
truth and reconciliation commissions); Labuda, supra note 40, at 32 (criticizing the
absence of communal responsibility as a limitation of truth and reconciliation
commissions and other prevalent transitional justice practices); Melia ThompsonDudiak, Comparison: Improving How the Legacies of State-Sponsored Segregation in
the United States and South Africa Affect Equity and Inclusion in American and
South African Higher Education Systems, 49 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 163, 201 (2018)
(discussing social attitudes towards redressing issues of racial equity in higher
education and the general lack of historical consciousness among the public about
the context of continued racial inequities in higher education).
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II. Lost in Transition: The Court’s Transitional
Jurisprudence Replicates the Relational Inequities of
Jim Crow by Perpetuating Attitudes of Black
Intellectual Inferiority
[A] desegregated society that is not integrated . . . leads to
physical proximity without spiritual affinity [and] gives us a
society where men are physically desegregated and spiritually
segregated, where elbows are together and hearts are apart. 99
—Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

In the absence of comprehensive federally-endorsed
reconciliatory initiatives, the diverse group of previously referenced
public and private sector stakeholders aspire to transform the
United States from a society that remains fractured by a largely
unacknowledged history of government-sanctioned human rights
violations into one where elbows and hearts are together and where
racial hierarchies are eradicated. But this observation about the
saliency of comprehensive federally-endorsed reconciliatory
initiatives assumes that transitional justice principles apply to
established democracies, such as the United States. The
proliferation of transitional justice inspired initiatives in
established democracies troubles some scholars who fear that the
moniker will become a generic label for any kind of political
transition.100 However, the shift from Jim Crow segregation—a
sociopolitical regime that nullified the mandates of the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments and their promise of full
legal inclusion for Black Americans 101—was no mundane political
transition, but a radical, paradigmatic one triggering transitional
justice. Because of segregation’s legacy of physical and
99. Ericka Aiken, Murder at Freedom’s Gate: Poverty, Race, & Education in
America, 5 GEO. J.L. & MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 31, 38 (2013) (internal
quotations omitted) (quoting Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Address at Nashville
Consultation: An Analysis of the Ethical Demands of Integration (Dec. 27, 1962)).
100. See, e.g., Davis & Scharrer, supra note 12, at 108–09, n.69 (noting the
traditional definition of transitional justice and considering whether its principles
apply to societies not experiencing a political transition but that are still fractured
by long-standing and pervasive human rights violations); Yamamoto et al., supra
note 14, at 120–27 (surveying domestic and international reconciliatory efforts and
transitional justice initiatives); Quinn, supra note 14, at 63–66, 75–78 (noting the
traditional conception of transitional justice and the expansion of transitional justice
principles by various scholars challenging the assumption that its principles are
inapplicable to settled democracies).
101. Turner, supra note 61, at 867–70; Jim Crow Laws, HIST., http://www.histor
y.com/topics/early-20th-century-us/jim-crow-laws [https://perma.cc/KTN6-K638].
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psychological atrocities against Black Americans, 102 social justice
advocates have argued that the struggle for civil rights in the
United States is comparable to the struggle for international
human rights.103 Malcolm X succinctly summarized the synergy
between the two movements, noting that civil rights is “[n]ot just an
American problem, but a World problem.” 104 Seizing upon yet
another connection between civil and human rights, Josie
Foehrenbach Brown alluded to deficiencies in the transition from
segregation, observing that “[f]rom the announcement of the Brown
opinion, we have failed as a nation to attend to the complicated
details of transitional justice.”105 This historical, political, and social
context informs the argument advanced in this section that the
broad remedial scope of transitional justice applies to the
desegregation of American schools. The first sub-section establishes
that the criteria identified by noted transitional justice scholars
applies to the desegregation of American schools. And the last subsection critiques the Brown cases and key cases in the Court’s
desegregation jurisprudence through the lens of transitional justice
and then explores some of the modern-day consequences of their
transitional deficiencies.
A. Brown I as a Transitional Rule of Law
Brown I was the beginning of a transitional period in
American society and in its system of public education. The Court
explicitly recognized the ways in which Jim Crow segregation
negatively impacted the educational experiences of Black
students106 and implicitly acknowledged how it divested Black
parents of the agency to make educational decisions for their
children, human rights107 that are freely available in truly
102. See discussion infra Sections II.A–B.
103. Casanova Willis & Willis, supra note 76, at 241 (discussing the 1951
publication of We Charge Genocide, the groundbreaking document by W.E.B. DuBois
and filed on behalf of the Civil Rights Congress equating the war crimes of Nazi
Germany to the evils of Jim Crow segregation in the United States).
104. Id. at 240.
105. Foehrenbach Brown, supra note 10, at 137.
106. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (“[I]n the field of
public education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place. Separate
educational facilities are inherently unequal.”).
107. See Roger J.R. Levesque, Educating American Youth: Lessons from
Children’s Human Rights Law, 27 J.L. & EDUC. 173, 187–90 (1998) (citing the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and discussing educational rights in human
rights law and the broad recognition of not only a right to education but one free from
discrimination and an education that is directed to “the full development of the
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democratic societies. The Court’s recognition of the ways in which
segregation stripped Black students of essential educational rights
signaled the beginning of the nation’s transition from the repressive
sociopolitical regime of de jure segregated education to a more
egalitarian political and educational system. 108 And so, in 1954, the
United States was a transitional society adapting to a new
sociopolitical order no longer premised on White supremacy.
Murphy has articulated a comprehensive analysis of the
sociopolitical conditions that trigger transitional justice. 109 Her
analysis rejects superficial political distinctions and instead
examines how purportedly democratic societies actually function.110
According to Murphy, transitional societies function in ways that
are profoundly different from truly democratic ones because they
exhibit the following four characteristics: pervasive structural
inequality, normalized collective and political wrongdoing, serious
existential uncertainty, and fundamental uncertainty about
authority.111 The following analysis supports the argument that
Brown I was a transitional rule of law, and thus substantiates the
applicability of transitional justice’s broad remedial framework to
the desegregation of American schools.
1. Exposing Pervasive Structural Inequalities and the
Normalized Collective Wrongdoing of Segregation
Brown I revealed the pervasive structural inequalities of Jim
Crow school segregation and implicitly repudiated the normalized
collective and political wrongdoing inherent in segregation. 112
Segregation is the paradigmatic example of pervasive structural
inequality. In transitional societies, pervasive structural

human personality” (quoting International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.A. 3 Art 13)).
108. See MILDRED WIGFALL ROBINSON & RICHARD J. BONNIE, Introduction to LAW
TOUCHED OUR HEARTS: A GENERATION REMEMBERS BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
4 (Mildred Wigfall Robinson & Richard J. Bonnie eds., 2009) (noting that the Court’s
denunciation of segregation as an educational policy in Brown I led to the ultimate
rejection of “legally enforced segregation in every area of life” in conjunction with the
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
109. See MURPHY, supra note 12, at 38–82 (describing exhaustively the four
circumstances of transitional justice).
110. See id. at 76–78 (discussing the need for a comprehensive assessment based
on the four circumstances of transitional justice before determining whether
transitional justice principles apply to established democracies such as the United
States).
111. Id. at 41.
112. See WIGFALL ROBINSON & BONNIE, supra note 108.
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inequalities are reflected in the ways that institutions create and
endorse practices that deprive their citizens of agency and
reciprocity that, in turn, result in inequitable treatment. 113 The
severity of these opportunity-stripping practices seriously
jeopardizes the legitimacy of societal institutions, creating “a moral
imperative to enact structural changes or reform.” 114 Lastly,
structural inequalities become pervasive when they cast doubt on
the legitimacy of societal institutions, creating a “reason to adopt
certain kind[s] of measures to overthrow that order.”115 Murphy
acknowledges that segregation is a classic example of pervasive
structural inequality.116 As an illustration, she uses the example of
apartheid in South Africa,117 a political regime based on racial
segregation that was virtually identical to Jim Crow segregation118
in the United States.119 One civil rights scholar eloquently captures
the extent of the pervasive structural inequalities of Jim Crow
segregation, comparing them to apartheid:
Jim Crow was more than the practice of racial segregation; it
was an applied ideology of [W]hite supremacy that did not just
keep African Americans in a fixed subordinate position in
society, it tried to push them further down, if not to eliminate
them altogether. Braced by violence, discrimination was built

113. MURPHY, supra note 12, at 44–45.
114. Id. at 49.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 46.
117. Id. at 47–48.
118. In the Southern states, Jim Crow laws, the term given to a collection of state
and local statutes that legalized segregation, subordinated Black Americans by
nullifying the mandates of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments
and their promise of full legal inclusion in United States’ democratic society and
returning the political and economic structure of the Southern states to an
antebellum class structure that resembled slavery. Turner, supra note 61, at 867–
70; see also Jim Crow Laws, supra note 101. Although the Northern states did not
inherit a political, social, and economic structure that was as rigidly segregated as
those in the South, they shared many of the same beliefs about the moral and
intellectual inferiority of Black Americans. See id. In Roberts v. City of Boston, the
Supreme Court of Massachusetts permitted segregation under the state’s
constitution. 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198, 209 (1849); In Pursuit of Equality,
SMITHSONIAN
NAT’L
MUSEUM
AM.
HIST.,
http://americanhistory.si.
edu/brown/history/2-battleground/pursuit-equality-1.html [https://perma.cc/MQ9VH9PW].
119. Zachary Norris, Repairing Harm from Racial Injustice: An Analysis of the
Justice Reinvestment Initiative and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 94
DENV. L. REV. 515, 517 (2017). See generally Benjamin Zinkel, Apartheid and Jim
Crow: Drawing Lessons from South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation, J. DISP.
RESOL. 229 (2019) (exhaustively comparing apartheid and Jim Crow segregation).
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into the legal, political, cultural, economic, social, and
educational scaffolding that reinforced [W]hite power and
denied African Americans the means to improve their lives,
hence the term American apartheid.120

Just as apartheid was a political, legal, and economic system
of exploitation that divested Black South Africans of agency and
reciprocity,121 Jim Crow segregation created differential
opportunities and limited prospects for Black Americans in access
to courts, employment, housing, and voting.122 But nowhere were
the pervasive structural inequalities of segregation more evident
than in public education.
Because of their ability to shape civic identity, schools are
classic examples of the kinds of norm-setting institutions where
victims of government sanctioned wrongdoing may lack agency and
reciprocity.123 Southern culture “was erected on the presumption of
[B]lack inability,” observed one scholar, and “Black prosperity and
success—indeed, [B]lack intelligence—were unimaginable and,
thus, justified the disparate funding in education that had led to
abysmal schools . . . .”124 Dr. Kenneth Clark, the renowned
psychologist hired by the NAACP legal defense team in preparation
for its attack on segregation, observed that in Clarendon County,
South Carolina, Black students learned in segregated school
environments of extreme deprivation with no running water, no
urinals, and no sinks for students, and that their classrooms had no
blackboards, maps, globes, auditoriums, or music rooms—facilities
that White students enjoyed.125 Although Blacks comprised 70% of
Clarendon County’s population and approximately 6,000 out of the
county’s 8,000 school-aged children, the county spent $100,000
more on the education of its White students. 126 In Delaware, state
120. ANNE VALK & LESLIE BROWN, LIVING WITH JIM CROW: AFRICAN AMERICAN
WOMEN AND MEMORIES OF THE SEGREGATED SOUTH 9 (2010); see also Neil G.
Williams, Brown v. Board of Education Fifty Years Later: What Makes for Greatness
in a Legal Opinion?, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 177, 178 (2004) (referring to Jim Crow
segregation as American apartheid).
121. Norris, supra note 119, at 517; Zinkel, supra note 119, at 233–35.
122. VALK & BROWN, supra note 120, at 12–13.
123. MURPHY, supra note 12, at 44.
124. CAROL ANDERSON, WHITE RAGE: THE UNSPOKEN TRUTH OF OUR RACIAL
DIVIDE 54 (2016).
125. PETER IRONS, JIM CROW’S CHILDREN: THE BROKEN PROMISE OF THE BROWN
DECISION 67 (Penguin Books 2004) (2002).
126. John W. White, Managed Compliance: White Resistance and Desegregation
in South Carolina, 1950–1970, at 27 (2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Florida) (on file at http://etd.fcla.edu/UF/UFE0013899/white_j.pdf
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officials “abdicated all responsibility for the education of its African
American citizens” and even thwarted efforts by the Black
community to generate private, philanthropic resources earmarked
for education.127 Furthermore, at the time of the Court’s decision in
Brown I, the entire state of Delaware had only one high school for
its Black students.128 Similarly, in Prince Edward County, Virginia,
no high school for Black students existed until 1939, although 45%
of the county’s population was composed of African Americans, and
by 1947, the only high school serving Black students was severely
overcrowded.129 The collective impact of these educational
inequities on the life prospects for Black students struggling for a
genuine opportunity for an education was devastating, and
according to one scholar:
The result of such widespread disparities in funding was that
the U.S. educational system, despite the demands of parents
and students craving high-quality schools, had deliberately
produced a sprawling, uneducated population. In Alabama,
Georgia, Louisiana, South Carolina, and Mississippi, with a
combined population of 4.7 million African Americans, more
than half of all [B]lack adults by the mid-1940s had less than
five years of formal education.130

As the disparities of Jim Crow segregation dominated every
aspect of Black life, Black Americans and their allies felt morally
compelled to overthrow it. Dr. King’s justification of civil
disobedience during the civil rights movement demonstrates the
moral imperative of overthrowing segregation: “An individual who
breaks a law that conscience tells him is unjust, and who willingly
accepts the penalty of imprisonment in order to arouse the
conscience of the community over its injustice, is in reality
expressing the highest respect for the law.” 131 King’s justification
for civil disobedience is echoed by civil rights scholars who
frequently use the language of revolution when discussing the
urgency for sociopolitical change heralded by Brown I. One scholar

[https://perma.cc/XS73-4QCZ]).
127. ANDERSON, supra note 124, at 68.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 68–69.
130. Id. at 70–71.
131. Katie Winston, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., CIV. DISOBEDIENCE,
http://disobediencecivil.weebly.com/dr-martin-luther-king-jr.html [https://perma.cc/
G8CK-7H2X].
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describes the decision as creating “a chain reaction in society
equivalent to that of nuclear fission.” 132 Another described Brown I
as the “day of reckoning” for segregation and noted the optimism
that Brown I generated among some in the Black community: “At
that moment, it appeared that citizenship—true citizenship—might
finally be at hand for African Americans.” 133 When Brown I was
decided, the United States was a transitional society where Black
Americans experienced pervasive structural inequality that limited
their agency and reciprocity in every aspect of their lives.
As “the day of reckoning” for segregation, Brown I also
implicitly repudiated the normalized collective and political
wrongdoing of Jim Crow segregation. Murphy defines normalized
collective and political wrongdoing as “actions or omissions of
particular human beings that result in violations of human
rights”134 perpetrated by state actors against a targeted
population.135 These human rights violations must be political,
meaning that they further “political goals or policies . . . about how
a given political society should be structured” 136 and become so
ubiquitous that they are normalized.137 Segregation was inherently
political because it created a “hierarchy of humanity that placed
Whiteness at the top and Blackness at the bottom.” 138 The ubiquity
of normalized collective and political wrongdoing during Jim Crow
segregation—lynchings,139 massacres that destroyed autonomous
132. Williams, supra note 120, at 178 (quoting Norman C. Amaker, Life, History
and the Constitution in the Struggle for Racial Equality, in BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY:
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE PRACTICE OF LAW 11 (A.L.I./A.B.A. Comm. on
Continuing Prof’l Educ. ed., June 1988)).
133. ANDERSON, supra note 124, at 74–75. But see Brown-Nagin, supra note 4, at
998 (discussing the historical ambivalence and hostility to Brown I by some in the
Black community); Paulette J. Delk, Training in Alabama, in LAW TOUCHED OUR
HEARTS: A GENERATION REMEMBERS BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 33, 33–34
(Mildred Wigfall Robinson & Richard J. Bonnie eds., 2009) (observing that the
decision went virtually unnoticed among Black educators in rural Baldwin County,
Alabama because of fear of retaliatory terminations).
134. MURPHY, supra note 12, at 49–50.
135. Id. at 53.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 55.
138. Our Story, CMTY. HEALING NETWORK, http://www.communityhealingnet.org
/our-story/ [https://perma.cc/B7CZ-B76G].
139. See Isabel Wilkerson, The Long-Lasting Legacy of the Great Migration,
Smithsonian Mag. (Sept. 2016), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/long-last
ing-legacy-great-migration-180960118/ [https://perma.cc/9HQD-7XA4]. According to
statistics from the Smithsonian, “[b]etween 1880 and 1950, an African-American was
lynched more than once a week for some perceived breach of the racial hierarchy.”
Id. Similarly, statistics indicate that “between 1877 and 1950, 4,075 ‘terror
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Black communities,140 the convict lease system,141 and educational
inequalities that left large segments of Black Americans poorly
educated142—are well documented in the historical record.
However, the issue of whether segregation violated the human
rights of Black Americans is controversial. 143 Much of the
controversy stems from the United Nation’s (UN) failure to hold the
United States accountable for its policies of state-sanctioned White
supremacy that justified segregation.144 The UN was founded
lynchings’ of African Americans occurred in the American South . . . .” Ursula Tracy
Doyle, Strange Fruit at the United Nations, 61 HOW. L.J. 187, 207 (2018) (citing
EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, LYNCHING IN AMERICA: CONFRONTING THE LEGACY OF
RACIAL TERROR 5 (3d ed. 2017); see also DEGRUY, supra note 78, at 96 (summarizing
failed congressional and presidential efforts to end lynching).
140. 1898 WILMINGTON RACE RIOT COMM’N, supra note 73, at 12. Perpetrated by
Whites with the assistance of state and local law enforcement authorities, these
massacres decimated autonomous, middle-class Black communities, destroying a
collective memory of Black educational, economic, cultural, and political autonomy.
See id. at 11–13, 256 (discussing the impact of the riot on the Black community, the
profound lack of political power of the Black community after the riot, and the ways
in which it negatively impacted all aspects of Black culture in that community); R.
Thomas Dye, The Rosewood Massacre: History and the Making of Public Policy, 19
PUB. HISTORIAN 25, 28 (1997) (discussing the Florida legislative mandate that led to
a Commission investigating the massacre in Rosewood, Florida); Tulsa Race
Massacre, supra note 71 (providing historical context for the eighteen-hour-long
massacre against the Greenwood community, home to a prosperous business district
known as the Black Wall Street).
141. DEGRUY, supra note 78, at 86–88. See generally DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON,
SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE
CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II (2008) (comprehensively examining the practice of
convict leasing and other forms of neo-slavery during Jim Crow segregation). Convict
leasing was a system of neo-slavery that began in the aftermath of Reconstruction
in which Black men, some of whom were falsely accused of criminal activity or
charged with crimes as amorphous as vagrancy and changing employers without
permission, were leased to businesses and farmers as a condition of their punishment
but seldom paid for their work. See id. at 53–57; DEGRUY, supra note 78, at 66–88.
Some historians estimate that “as many as a quarter of all black leased convicts
throughout the South died while still under lease.” DEGRUY, supra note 78, at 87
(citation omitted). And in Southern states of the former confederacy such as
Alabama, “[c]onvict leasing was so successful that by 1898 nearly three quarters of
Alabama’s total state revenue came directly from this institution.” Id. at 88.
142. See discussion infra Section II.B (discussing disparities in funding and
infrastructure investment).
143. See generally Doyle, supra note 139 (examining extensively the United
Nation’s failure to directly condemn Jim Crow segregation); Margaret R. Somers &
Christopher N.J. Roberts, Toward a New Sociology of Rights: A Genealogy of “Buried
Bodies” of Citizenship and Human Rights, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 385, 385 (2008)
(discussing extensively the “struggles for inclusion and recognition surrounding
human rights and citizenship—much of which has been hidden from history
(especially African American human rights movements)”).
144. See Doyle, supra note 139, at 210. The United Nations was founded “in the
wake of the Holocaust, a tragedy which spurred governments to vow that mass
atrocities on this scale would never happen again[,]” with the goal of reaffirming
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during the throes of Jim Crow segregation; but, although it
vociferously condemned South African apartheid in the 1950s, it
never denounced segregation in the United States. 145 Instead, it
generally referenced the evils of racial segregation and
discrimination, unambiguously asserting that these practices
violate human rights and fundamental freedoms outlined in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). 146 However, in
the context of education, Article 26 of the UDHR describes the right
to public education as a human right, recognizes that all children
have a right to an education free of bias and discrimination, 147 and
provides that “[e]ducation shall be directed to the full development
of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms.”148 Given the UN’s
general denunciation of segregation and racially discriminatory
educational practices and specific condemnation of apartheid, Jim
Crow segregation violated the human rights of Black Americans.
And so, when Brown I was decided, the United States was a
transitional society characterized by normalized collective and
political wrongdoing.
2. Creating Serious Existential Uncertainty and
Fundamental Uncertainties About Authority
Brown I also created serious existential uncertainties about
the stability of a sociopolitical order no longer rooted in White
supremacy and about the authority of the federal judiciary. In
Murphy’s analytical paradigm, serious existential uncertainty
occurs when, in the face of “credible attempts to disrupt the status
quo overhauling pervasive structural inequality,” 149 officials are
uncertain about whether the old political order will return or
whether the new, more progressive one will succeed. 150 Victims of
normalized collective and political wrongdoing also experience a
similar kind of existential uncertainty; they, too, are uncertain
about whether the new political order will lead to the elimination of
“faith in . . . the dignity and worth of the human person [and] in the equal rights of
men and women.” Id. at 189, 195 (first alteration in original) (quoting U.N. Charter
pmbl.).
145. Id. at 209–10, 212–14.
146. See id. at 211–12 (discussing the requirements of resolution 103(I)).
147. See Levesque, supra note 107, at 187–90.
148. Id. at 190 (alteration in original) (quoting Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A, (31) GAOR 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), Art. 26(2)).
149. MURPHY, supra note 12, at 70.
150. Id. at 68.
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structural inequalities or whether the violence and social inequities
of the old political order will return. 151 Due to the instability of the
new sociopolitical order, individual decision-making becomes
extremely difficult.152 The Court’s ruling in Brown I was
immediately followed by massive resistance, 153 creating existential
uncertainties about the success of desegregation and the future of
public education. The most infamous, sustained examples of
resistance to school desegregation occurred in Virginia, dubbed by
one scholar as the “birthplace of Massive Resistance.”154 Virginia
Governor James Lindsay Almond closed schools in Charlottesville,
Norfolk, and Front Royal in defiance of court orders to desegregate,
proclaiming that: “We will oppose . . . with every facility at our
command, and with every ounce of our energy, the attempt being
made to mix the [W]hite and Negro races in our classrooms.” 155
Fearing the eminent desegregation of Virginia schools, local
officials in Prince Edward County diverted tax dollars from the
public schools into all-White Prince Edward Academy and offered
White parents state-funded tuition grants.156 This pattern of
funneling state money to private, segregated schools was replicated
all over the state, and, as a result of the diversion of millions of tax
dollars, nearly twenty percent of Virginia’s public schools closed. 157
The massive closing of public schools in Virginia cast the state into
what one scholar described as an “educational apocalypse” with dire
repercussions for Black students in Prince Edward County:
151. Id. at 66–67.
152. Id. at 68.
153. Turner, supra note 61, at 889.
154. ANDERSON, supra note 124, at 81.
155. Prince
Edward
Free
Schools
Association,
HIST.
ENGINE,
http://historyengine.richmond.edu/episodes/view/4444 [https://perma.cc/YUN3-TP4
E]. Other Southern governors took a similar stance of defiance. See RICHARD
ROTHSTEIN, ECON. POLICY INST., SEGREGATION THEN, SEGREGATION SINCE:
EDUCATION AND THE UNFINISHED MARCH 2 (2013), http://www.epi.org/publ
ication/unfinished-march-public-school-segregation [https://perma.cc/6XSX-ZAPA];
Little Rock School Desegregation, STAN.: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. RES. & EDUC.
INST., http://kinginstitute.stanford.edu/encyclopedia/little-rock-school-desegregation
[https://perma.cc/QCX6-4PGA]. Governor Orval Faubus of Arkansas closed all four
of Little Rock’s public high schools in the fall of 1958 rather than proceed with
desegregation. See id. One year later in December 1959, the Supreme Court ordered
the school board to reopen the city’s high schools. See id. In Alabama, Governor
George Wallace vowed to defend segregation by defying the court’s edict in Brown I,
proudly proclaiming that “I draw the line in the dust . . . and toss the gauntlet before
the feet of tyranny, and I say segregation now, segregation tomorrow, and
segregation forever.” Id. at 2.
156. ANDERSON, supra note 124, at 68, 83.
157. Id. at 83.
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While [W]hite children were educated, 2,700 [B]lack children
were locked out. The defiance of Prince Edward County was
singular—no other school system remained closed for five years
(1959 to 1964) rather than comply with Brown. The
impoverished but determined African American community
managed to send some children away to relatives, but only
thirty-five black students were able to attend those out-of-state
schools on a full time basis.158

The looming threat of violence caused by massive resistance to
desegregation and school closures also demonstrates the difficulties
of individual decision-making and the existential uncertainties
faced by the parents of school-aged children. White parents were
faced with a dilemma: acquiesce to the social pressures created by
the resistance and remove their children from public schools or
allow their children to attend desegregated schools, a choice that
was most likely fraught with fear, given centuries-old stereotypes
about the moral, social, and intellectual inferiority of Black
students and realistic concerns about the potential for violence in
newly integrated schools.159 Black parents faced a similar dilemma:
acquiesce to the social pressures created by the resistance and forgo
desegregated schools,160 object to desegregated schools on cultural
or social grounds,161 or exercise the agency and reciprocity promised
158. Id. at 83–84. See generally CHRISTOPHER BONASTIA, SOUTHERN STALEMATE:
FIVE YEARS WITHOUT PUBLIC EDUCATION IN PRINCE EDWARD COUNTY, VIRGINIA 2
(2012) (detailing the history of Prince Edward County’s contentious school
desegregation). In 1963, the Federal Government intervened, establishing privately
funded Free Schools to address the educational deprivations and prepare the Black
children of Prince Edward County for the reopening of the public schools. See Prince
Edward Free Schools Association, supra note 155.
159. See, e.g., White, supra note 126, at 32–33, 43–46 (discussing the anxieties of
White South Carolinians to the threat of school desegregation and threat of violence
to prevent desegregation); Virginia’s “Massive Resistance” to School Desegregation,
U. VA.’S DIG. RES. FOR U.S. HIST., http://www2.vcdh.virginia.edu/xslt/servlet/XSL
TServlet?xml=/xml_docs/solguide/Essays/essay13a.xml&xsl=/xml_docs/solguide/sol
_new.xsl&section=essay [https://perma.cc/PKR2-NSFZ] (discussing the promises
and risks of school desegregation among Black and White Virginians).
160. See RICHARD J. BONNIE, What I Learned When Massive Resistance Closed My
School, in LAW TOUCHED OUR HEARTS: A GENERATION REMEMBERS BROWN V. BOARD
OF EDUCATION 135–38 (Mildred Wigfall Robinson & Richard J. Bonnie eds., 2009)
(discussing the personal awakening that he experienced as a White student whose
Norfolk, Virginia elementary school was closed amidst massive resistance to
segregation by Governor J. Lindsay Almond); White, supra note 126, at 28–29
(discussing the economic and physically violent reprisals faced by Blacks in
Clarendon County, South Carolina after filing legal challenges to school
segregation).
161. Brown-Nagin, supra note 4, at 993 n.13.
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by Brown I and risk the physical and psychological violence of White
parents and school officials.162
Other Southern states enacted less dramatic measures that
also created existential uncertainties about the success of school
segregation. Under the guise of paternalism, North Carolina
Governor Luther Hodges crafted a plan of “voluntary segregation”
designed to exploit the fears in the Black community about the
potential for massive deculturalization in Brown I’s aftermath.163
“[I]f [B]lacks voluntarily remained in their own schools,” Hodges
reasoned, then “they would receive superior facilities and also be
able to better preserve their own culture and traditions than if they
enrolled their children in school with [W]hites.” 164 Playing into fears
and uncertainties about the cultural risks of desegregation, Hodges
warned that “if [B]lacks did not voluntarily go to segregated
schools . . . then they would be responsible for school closures,
robbing their children of educational opportunities in the
process.”165 These subtle delay tactics coupled with the more overt
ones of other Southern governors166 successfully stalled
desegregation for a decade, as reflected by statistics indicating that
in the decade after Brown I only an estimated 2% of Black children
in the formerly de jure segregated Southern states attended school
with White children.167
The sociopolitical context in the aftermath of Brown I also
manifested fundamental uncertainties about the Supreme Court’s
authority to end segregation. Although similar to serious existential
uncertainty, fundamental uncertainty about authority relates to
who has standing to redress government sanctioned wrongdoing
and pervasive structural inequities.168 In stable democracies, “there
is widespread social acceptance of the authority of the branches of
government, including the judiciary.”169 However, in transitional

162. See Charles E. Daye, Promise and Paradox, in LAW TOUCHED OUR HEARTS:
A GENERATION REMEMBERS BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 95, 100–01 (Mildred
Wigfall Robinson & Richard J. Bonnie eds., 2009) (discussing the anxieties and
existential uncertainties faced by Black parents during desegregation).
163. ANDERS WALKER, THE GHOST OF JIM CROW: HOW SOUTHERN MODERATES
USED BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION TO STALL CIVIL RIGHTS 50 (2009).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 155 at 2; Little Rock School Desegregation, supra
note 155.
167. WIGFALL ROBINSON & BONNIE, supra note 108.
168. MURPHY, supra note 12, at 74.
169. Id. at 75.
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societies, multiple sources of authority may operate
simultaneously,170 causing people to “openly question and challenge
the new [political order] both as a general matter and in regard to
dealing with past wrongs.”171 After Brown I, much of the
resistance’s enmity was aimed at the federal judiciary, challenging
the authority of the lower federal courts to implement
desegregation, shunning and denouncing judges who were
perceived as sympathetic to desegregation, and attacking the
Court’s authority to invalidate Jim Crow segregation.172 Faced with
this massive resistance from multiple governmental and nongovernmental sources—governors, mayors, local school boards, and
White parents opposing segregated schools—and the equally
massive campaign to sustain the new sociopolitical order by the
NAACP, Dr. King, and other champions of desegregation—
American society was plagued by fundamental uncertainties about
who had the authority to invalidate segregation. 173 The resistance
consisted not only of overtly violent groups, such as the Ku Klux
Klan, but “respected elements in [W]hite society—governors,
legislators, U.S. senators, congressmen, and even more tepidly, the
president of the United States.” 174 However, one of the most wellknown political attacks on the Supreme Court’s authority came
from nineteen Senators and eighty-one House of Representatives
members who signed what is popularly known as the Southern
Manifesto.175 Denouncing Brown I as an abuse of judicial authority
and a violation of the separation of powers and other democratic
principles, its signatories grounded their objection in an
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment that implicitly
endorsed segregation, noting that “[t]he very Congress which
proposed the amendment subsequently provided for segregated
schools in the District of Columbia.”176 When viewed in its totality,

170. Id. at 72–73.
171. Id. at 74.
172. ANDERSON, supra note 124, at 80.
173. Sanjay Mody, Brown Footnote Eleven in Historical Context: Social Science
and the Supreme Court’s Quest for Legitimacy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 793, 815–19 (2002)
(noting resistance from governors, mayors, local school boards, and White parents
opposing segregated schools—and the equally massive campaign to sustain the new
sociopolitical order by the NAACP, Dr. King, and other champions of desegregation).
174. ANDERSON, supra note 124, at 75–76.
175. Turner, supra note 61, at 889.
176. 102 CONG. REC. 4459–60 (1956). Howard Smith of Virginia, chairman of the
House Rules Committee, introduced the Southern Manifesto in a speech on the
House Floor. The Southern Manifesto of 1956, HIST., ART, & ARCHIVES: THE U.S.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, http://history.house.gov/Historical-Highlights/19512000/The-Southern-Manifesto-of-1956/ [https://perma.cc/6Z8G-YVZ3].
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the massive resistance to Brown I supports the argument that it
triggered the beginning of a transitional period in American society
characterized by fundamental uncertainty about authority.
B. The Transitional Deficiencies of Brown I and the Court’s
Desegregation Jurisprudence
Because Brown I triggered the beginning of a transitional
period in American society and in its system of public education, the
United States government had an equitable duty to establish a
comprehensive remedial framework to repudiate deeply entrenched
attitudes and stereotypes about Black inferiority during the
desegregation of American schools. However, unlike the South
African government’s endorsement of transitional justice practices
in its transition from apartheid,177 the United States government
underutilized the array of transitional practices at its disposal such
as truth and reconciliation commissions, executive and legislative
fact-finding initiatives,178 and museums to redress government
sanctioned White supremacy that normalized the human rights
violations of Jim Crow segregation. This underutilization caused
profound deficiencies in the transition from segregation. DeGruy
attributes the South African government’s endorsement of the
SATRC as a significant factor in defusing some of the animosity,
bitterness, and racial division in post-apartheid South Africa.179
The Federal Government’s lack of accountability for slavery and the
177. CHARLES ABRAHAMS, CORPORATE LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS ABUSES IN SOUTH AFRICA 1 (2008), https://www.business-humanrights.org//s
ites/default/files/reports-and-materials/Charles-Abrahams-commentary.pdf [https://
perma.cc/8EH7-AKXH]. South Africa became a democratic country on April 27, 1994,
resulting in what one legal commentator described as “not only . . . a fundamental
change in the political landscape, but . . . a new constitutional legal order
unparalleled in the country’s history.” Id.
178. See Alice George, The 1968 Kerner Commission Got it Right, But Nobody
Listened, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Mar. 1, 2018), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/smit
hsonian-institution/1968-kerner-commission-got-it-right-nobody-listened-18096831
8/ [https://perma.cc/Z852-CTCS]. Presidential commissions are one example of a factfinding initiative. See id. Of particular note is the Kerner Commission, commissioned
by President Lyndon Johnson in 1968 to identify the causes of violent racial riots in
1967 in Detroit and Newark. See id. Another notable example of a presidential
commission that evoked issues germane to transitional justice was the President’s
Commission on the Holocaust commissioned by President Jimmy Carter in 1978. See
ELIE WIESEL, PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON THE HOLOCAUST, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
(1979), https://www.ushmm.org/m/pdfs/20050707-presidents-commission-holocaust.
pdf [https://perma.cc/PE5J-DGKQ]. The commission’s task was to investigate the
most appropriate way for the nation to honor those who perished in the Holocaust.
Id. at 1–2.
179. DEGRUY, supra note 78, at 20.
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neo-slavery of Jim Crow segregation, according to DeGruy, has
become pathological. Such denial has allowed this illness to fester
for almost 400 years. It is what keeps this country sick with this
issue of race.”180 Acclaimed journalist Ta-Nehisi Coates echoes
DeGruy’s observations: “Until we reckon with our compounding
moral debts, America will never be whole . . . .What I’m talking
about is more than recompense . . . .What is needed is a healing of
the American psyche.”181 DeGruy’s and Coates’s lamentations
highlight the difficulty of reconciliation in transitional societies.
According to Yamamoto, “[R]econciliation initiated does not signal
social healing achieved. Reconciliation is a long-term, multi-faceted
political, social, and economic process. It bears potential not only for
significant legal and social benefits but also for incompleteness and
even regression.”182 When considered within a conceptual
framework of reconciliation that envisions sustained, multi-faceted
responses to past human rights abuses, the limited scope of the
federally-endorsed transitional justice inspired initiatives
referenced in Part II attests to the reconciliatory deficiencies in the
nation’s transition from segregation.
The Federal Government’s reliance on the rule of law as the
exclusive vehicle for eradicating stereotypes about Black inferiority
also attests to the reconciliatory deficiencies in the nation’s
transition from segregation. Because of pervasive structural
inequalities in transitional societies, “promoting the rule of law is
insufficient for restoring or establishing political relationships
among equals.”183 Consequently, changing the law without
adequately addressing stereotypes of Black inferiority at the root of
Jim Crow segregation left these stereotypes firmly intact in the
hearts and minds of the nation184 and guaranteed a weak
transitional framework that ultimately resulted in the
180. Id.; see also DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN
APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 16 (1993)
(highlighting the hypocrisy of Americans who “have been quick to criticize the
apartheid system of South Africa . . . have been reluctant to acknowledge the
consequences of their own institutionalized system of racial separation”); Norman C.
Amaker, The Haunting Presence of the Opinion in Brown v. Board of Education, 20
S. ILL. U. L.J. 3, 7–8 (1995) (“[N]ever in our history as a people have any of us, [B]lack
or [W]hite, been ‘neutral’ on the matter of race. It has been, and remains, the great
overriding issue throughout all our history, in all our law, in all our institutions.”)
(emphasis added).
181. Coates, supra note 58.
182. Yamamoto et al., supra note 14, at 116.
183. MURPHY, supra note 12, at 130.
184. JULIE KAILIN, ANTIRACIST EDUCATION: FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE 42 (2002).
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abandonment of integration as an educational policy. 185 Although
transitional justice had not yet emerged as a remedial discipline
when the Brown cases were decided, its emphasis on healing
“hearts and minds” to nurture a set of cultural values that would
prevent the re-emergence of attitudes of Black inferiority at the root
of de jure segregation was a familiar concept to the Court, as
evidenced by the inclusion of the phrase in its opinion. 186
Furthermore, President Dwight Eisenhower warned Chief Justice
Earl Warren, Brown I’s author, of the difficulties of supplanting
almost ninety years of segregation, supposedly remarking that “law
and force cannot change a man’s heart.”187 Ironically, the challenge
of changing “hearts and minds” was one of the central arguments of
those who resisted desegregation.188 The Court’s awareness of the
necessity of changing hearts and minds and its subsequent failure
to construct a transitional framework for combating the societal
notions of Black inferiority is particularly troubling in a case that
holds “near sacred status in the annals of [S]upreme [C]ourt
jurisprudence.”189 The discussion that follows explores the
transitional deficiencies in the Brown cases and in notable cases in
the Supreme Court’s desegregation jurisprudence.
1.

Brown I Perpetuates Stereotypes of Black Intellectual
Inferiority and the Relational Inequalities of Jim Crow

In commenting on the significance of the Brown cases, one
scholar observed that “[i]t is difficult to criticize a case that no
longer stands for a legal point, becoming instead a central part of
the social mythology of the country.”190 A central part of that social
185. WIGFALL ROBINSON & BONNIE, supra note 108, at 171, 174; Kevin D. Brown,
Brown v. Board of Education: Reexamination of the Desegregation of Public
Education from the Perspective of the Post-Desegregation Era, 35 U. TOL. L. REV. 773,
773 (2004); Noah Berlatsky, White Parents Are Enabling School Segregation—If It
Doesn’t Hurt Their Own Kids, NBC NEWS: THINK (Mar. 11, 2019, 4:35 AM),
http://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/white-parents-are-enabling-schoolsegregation-if-it-doesn-t-ncna978446 [https://perma.cc/7ZTB-FA5T].
186. Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
187. WIGFALL ROBINSON & BONNIE, supra note 108, at 1.
188. See Brief of John Ben Shepperd, Attorney General of Texas, Amicus Curiae
at 2, 4–5, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), 1954 WL 45721 (arguing
that segregation was the public will and that “[n]o individual can be forced against
his will to accept, associate, or cohabit with another not of his choosing” and
“[c]ompulsion can only arouse resentment, individual discrimination,
and . . . violence”).
189. CASHIN, supra note 4, at 208.
190. Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Black People in White Face: Assimilation, Culture, and
the Brown Case, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 665, 665 (1995).
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mythology is what these cases have come to symbolize to the
dominant culture: the end of racism and legally sanctioned inequity
in public schools.191 And, according to another scholar, “[t]he older
Brown gets, the more unwilling white society is to explore our
history and its connection to modern racism and inequality.”192
When these sentiments are juxtaposed with the sentiments of
others for whom the cases are a source of enduring sadness,
disappointment, and even bitterness, 193 an ethos about the
elusiveness of educational equity emerges that was eloquently
summarized by Cornel West who opined that America was at its
best in Brown I and at its worst in Brown II.194 These divergent
interpretations about the significance of the Brown cases attest to
their transitional deficiencies. Authored by activist justices with the
political agenda of repudiating segregation, Brown I is an
extraordinary example of a transitional judicial opinion that
announced transformative, revolutionary rules that changed
America’s legal, cultural, and educational landscape. Brown I
repudiated Plessy’s195 distinction between the political rights
guaranteed by the equal protection clause and the civil and social
equality of Black Americans that ignored the reality of the postreconstruction South that had begun nullifying the mandates of the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments and their
promises of full legal inclusion for Black Americans. 196 In stark
contrast, Brown I was a political decision; the Court did not ignore
the sociopolitical context of the Cold War or the hypocrisy of

191. Rosiek, supra note 4, at 8.
192. Sharon E. Rush, Toto, I have a Feeling We Are Still in Kansas, in LAW
TOUCHED OUR HEARTS: A GENERATION REMEMBERS BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
43, 43–45 (Mildred Wigfall Robinson & Richard J. Bonnie eds., 2009).
193. See, e.g., Foehrenbach Brown, supra note 10, at 134–35 (noting that the
anxiety and distrust among those in the Black community in the aftermath of the
Brown decisions that “in hindsight . . . appears tragically prescient as we examine
the educational fortunes of African-American children since May 17, 1954”); Brown,
supra note 185, at 782–83 (“America is torn between congratulating itself over the
obvious progress on race relations . . . and being demoralized over the lack of
success.”).
194. See Brown Commentators’ Roundtable, Day One, NPR: THE TAVIS SMILEY
SHOW (May 17, 2004), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=18988
31 [https://perma.cc/EZ3R-XW7H]; CASHIN, supra note 4, at 208 (“Brown is a
decision that makes us proud of ourselves.”).
195. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1869).
196. Lani Guinier, From Racial Liberalism to Racial Literacy: Brown v. Board of
Education and the Interest-Divergence Dilemma, 90 J. AM. HIST. 92, 109 (2004);
Turner, supra note 61, at 866–69; Jim Crow Laws, supra note 101.
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endorsing segregation while simultaneously promoting the nation
as an exemplar of the liberalizing values of democracy.197
However, Brown I’s political nature was also the source of its
inherent weakness, one that would not be corrected in the Court’s
desegregation jurisprudence and that ultimately contributed to
profound reconciliatory deficiencies in the nation’s transition from
segregation. Brown I’s transitional deficiencies are rooted in the
Court’s superficial analysis of the stigma rationale that replicated
the imbalanced relationships of Jim Crow segregation. In
transitional societies, rules of law embedded in judicial opinions are
narratives that create a framework for transforming relationships
once characterized by pervasive structural inequalities into
egalitarian ones where historically marginalized groups are
treated, not as outsiders, but encouraged to fully participate as
equals in the political community. 198 Eradicating stereotypes is
another key function of effective transitional judicial narratives.199
Unaddressed stereotypes can contribute to pervasive structural
inequality, resulting in a diminution of agency and reciprocity
among the targeted group that invites ridicule by the dominant
society that, if internalized, diminishes that group’s ability to
meaningfully contribute to society.200
Jim Crow segregation was a sociopolitical regime premised on
a wide range of stereotypes201 that purportedly justified the
pervasive structural inequalities that subordinated Black
Americans in all aspects of their lives.202 A key aspect of that

197. See generally Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the
Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980) (discussing the
desegregation campaign after Brown and offering an explanation why desegregation
has failed and offering solutions to bring about change). Preeminent civil rights
scholar Derrick Bell highlighted Brown I’s political nature in what scholars have
coined as “the interest convergence theory.” Id. at 522–28. Critical race scholar
Richard Delgado describes Bell’s theory as a “materialist analysis which seeks to
explain the shifting tides of racial history by reference to underlying conditions such
as labor needs, international competition, and the search for profit.” Richard
Delgado, The Shadows and the Fire: Three Puzzles for Civil Rights Scholars: An
Essay in Honor of Derrick Bell, 6 ALA. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 21, 21 n.3
(2014) (summarizing Bell’s theory).
198. MURPHY, supra note 12, at 132.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Regina Austin, Back to Basics: Returning to the Matter of Black Inferiority
and White Supremacy in the Post-Brown Era, 6 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 79, 81
(2004) (“When Brown was decided, it was a core belief of American society that
[B]lacks were by nature intellectually, morally, and culturally inferior to [W]hites.”).
202. See supra Part III.
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subordination was Black intellectual inferiority, an ideology
premised on pseudo-scientific theories that claimed to conclusively
establish the intellectual superiority of White Americans. 203 These
pseudo-scientific theories would, according to one scholar, “make
race the crucial determinant of human progress or
retrogression . . . [and] had the effect of weeding out people of color
from the ranks of those considered ‘able’ or ‘intelligent.’” 204 As this
stratification of the races based on intellectual ability continued,
Black Americans would increasingly become defined as
“permanent, degraded outsiders.”205 These notions of Black
intellectual inferiority and outsider status would become deeply
engrained into the fabric of American education during slavery and
segregation, and consequently “[t]he history of American education
is a history of . . . continuous struggle by African-Americans to be
educated for first-class rather than for second-class citizenship.”206
Theories of Black intellectual inferiority were also engrafted
into the Constitution by the Supreme Court’s infamous decisions in
Dred Scott207 and Plessy208 that dehumanized and objectified Black
Americans.209 These theories of Black intellectual inferiority would
also be engrafted into Brown I.210 Under the Warren Court’s stigma
203. KAILIN, supra note 184, at 29.
204. Id. at 31–32.
205. Aird, supra note 80, at 11.
206. KAILIN, supra note 184, at 33 (citing scholar Theresa Perry).
207. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). In this case, the Court held that
Blacks living in the United States could never become citizens. Id. at 393. Its decision
invalidated the Missouri Compromise and, according to scholars, became the
precursor to the Civil War. Andrew Glass, Supreme Court Decides Dred Scott Case,
March 6, 1857, POLITICO (Mar. 6, 2018, 12:01 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/20
18/03/06/supreme-court-decides-dred-scott-case-march-6-1857-435658 [https://perm
a.cc/LQ49-M56L].
208. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Notably, Justice John Harlan, the
lone dissenter in Plessy, strenuously disagreed with the majority about the legality
of de jure segregation. However, even he believed that Whites were the superior race.
Id. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
209. See A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., The Ten Precepts of American Slavery
Jurisprudence: Chief Justice Roger Taney’s Defense and Justice Thurgood Marshall’s
Condemnation of the Precept of Black Inferiority, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1695, 1705–
06, 1708 (1996) (observing the “unspoken pact of convenient myth” between
Thurgood Marshall and the Warren Court that ignored the United States’ history
and that of the Supreme Court of racial subordination premised on ideologies of
Black inferiority and White supremacy).
210. See Brown, supra note 185, at 785 (arguing that the Court “did not reject the
fundamental belief in the inferiority of black people”); Daye, supra note 162, at 95,
99 (noting the inherently political nature of the decision and arguing that “[n]either
the framers of the equal protection clause nor the Supreme Court ever manifested
either an egalitarian ideal or moral or ethical clarity favoring equality in fact for
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rationale, Black students were the lone injured parties; according
to the Court, “Segregation . . . has a detrimental effect on the colored
children” that “has a tendency to [retard] the educational and
mental development of negro children and to deprive them of some
of the benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school
system.”211 However, by identifying Black students as the only
parties injured by de jure segregation, the Court assumed that
White students were not injured by segregation and that notions of
White supremacy were not injurious to the egalitarian ideals of
democracy,212 assumptions likely grounded in notions of White
Supremacy deeply engrained in American society.213 Given societal
attitudes of Black inferiority extant in the larger society and
acknowledged in Brown I, the Warren Court most likely could not
imagine a scenario where White students would derive any benefit
from exposure to Black students who society deemed intellectually
inferior.214
The assumptions at the root of the Court’s stigma rationale
perpetuated the outsider narrative inherent in stereotypes of Black
intellectual inferiority. The Court’s analysis was framed narrowly;
the only relevant inquiry was the intangible consequences of de jure
segregated schools, not the tangible disparities in funding,
infrastructure investment, and low teacher-to-student ratios that
plagued pre-integration Black schools.215 Given the narrowness of
its analysis, the Court’s declaration that segregation deprived Black
students of “some of the benefits they would receive in a racial[ly]

black citizens”).
211. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (alteration in
original) (emphasis added).
212. See Sharon E. Rush, Protecting the Dignity and Equality of Children: The
Importance of Integrated Schools, 20 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 73, 92 (2010)
(criticizing the opinion for saying “nothing about the invalidity of the myth of white
superiority”).
213. Id. at 91; Brown, supra note 185, at 776–79.
214. See IRONS, supra note 125, at 148 (discussing Justice Stanley Reed’s
comments suggesting his support for notions of White supremacy inherent in Jim
Crow segregation); ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE DISUNITING OF AMERICA:
REFLECTIONS ON MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY 63 (1998) (opining that “[m]ost [W]hite
Americans through most of American history simply considered colored Americans
inferior and unassimilable”); Austin, supra note 201, at 81 (noting that “[w]hen
Brown was decided, it was a core belief of American society that [B]lacks were by
nature intellectually, morally, and culturally inferior to [W]hites”).
215. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 492–93; Joseph O. Oluwole & Preston C. Green III,
Riding the Plessy Train: Reviving Brown for a New Civil Rights Era for MicroDesegregation, 36 CHICANX-LATINX L. REV. 1, 33 (2019).

40

Law & Inequality

[Vol. 38: 2

integrated school system,”216 suggests that the only remedy for
Black students’ stigmatic injuries was proximity to the intangible
benefits readily available to White students in their school
environment.217 By casting Black students as outsiders in need of
redemption by proximity to White students, the Court’s transitional
narrative exacerbated the pervasive structural inequalities of de
jure segregation, reinforcing the racial hierarchies of segregation
where Black Americans were treated as outsiders at the bottom of
“a hierarchy of humanity that placed Whiteness at the top and
Blackness at the bottom.”218 Once labelled as psychologically
injured outsiders, Black students would be impaired in their ability
to fully participate as equals in integrated schools and become
vulnerable to overt or covert ridicule by White students, teachers,
and school administrators.
Furthermore, Brown I’s stigma rationale replicated the
imbalanced relationships of Jim Crow segregation by promoting an
assimilationist model for desegregation. The history of Black
education did not begin in 1954, although that is the date when
issues of educational equity most likely entered into the nation’s
collective consciousness.219 Beginning in slavery when teaching
Blacks to read was a crime,220 Whites used education, or the lack
thereof, to subordinate Black Americans, a practice that, according
to one civil rights historian “remained virtually unchanged well into
the twentieth century.”221 Although the dominant culture used
education as a tool of subordination, Black Americans used
education as a shield “to lead people toward what was considered
their historic responsibility—[building] a better, more just and
decent society.”222 However, this rich tradition of Black education is
216. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 494.
217. See Williams, supra note 120, at 181, 182–84 (summarizing critiques of the
Court’s stigma rationale for its assumptions of Black inferiority) (alteration in
original).
218. See Our Story, supra note 138.
219. See KAILIN, supra note 184, at 34 (observing that Brown I was “the first time
the U.S. government made a formal commitment to include Blacks in the promise of
educational equity”); SCHLESINGER, JR., supra note 214, at 63 “[T]he cruelty with
which [W]hite Americans have dealt with [B]lack Americans has been compounded
by the callousness with which white historians have dealt with Black history.”).
220. See Literacy as Freedom, SMITHSONIAN AM. ART MUSEUM, http://americanex
perience.si.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Literacy-as-Freedom.pdf [https://perma
.cc/SEY2-UBXZ] (“After the slave revolt led by Nat Turner in 1831, all slave states
except Maryland, Kentucky, and Tennessee passed laws against teaching slaves to
read and write.”).
221. ANDERSON, supra note 124, at 45.
222. See KAILIN, supra note 184, at 35.
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often overlooked in the scholarly discourse and in the nation’s
collective memory.223 In critiquing the conspicuous absence of
scholarly inquiry into the complexities of Jim Crow segregation,
historian Tomiko Brown-Nagin observed that “the tendency among
scholars . . . is to view the pre-Brown period exclusively through the
lens of deprivation, as if the Court’s stigma rhetoric accurately
described the complex reality of human experience during this
era.”224 Historian Vanessa Siddle Walker makes similar
observations about narratives of deprivation commonly ascribed to
pre-integration Black schools, observing that:
In this national memory, southern African Americans were
victims of [W]hites who questioned the utility of providing
[B]lacks with anything more than a rudimentary
education . . . . The children suffered immeasurably and, the
memory assumes, received little of educational value until they
were desegregated into the superior [W]hite systems.225

Walker argues that “to remember segregated schools largely
by recalling only their poor resources presents a historically
incomplete picture.”226 A more complete, historical picture of preintegration Black schools developed by Walker and scholars such as
Faustine Jones, Thomas Sowell, and Adam Fairclough depicts a
school environment characterized by high teacher expectations,
academic rigor, and psychological support even amidst the
disparities in funding, infrastructure investment, and teacher-tostudent ratios that characterized the pervasive structural
inequalities of Jim Crow segregation.227 And in the collective

223. See Thomas Sowell, Black Excellence—The Case of Dunbar High School, 35
PUB. INT. 3, 3 (1974) (remarking on the “voluminous outpourings on [B]lack
educational pathology” but only the occasional coverage and recognition of the long
history of Black educational achievement).
224. Brown-Nagin, supra note 4, at 996.
225. VANESSA SIDDLE WALKER, THEIR HIGHEST POTENTIAL: AN AFRICAN
AMERICAN SCHOOL COMMUNITY IN THE SEGREGATED SOUTH 1 (1996) [hereinafter
Siddle Walker I].
226. Id. at 3.
227. See id. at 3–6, 215–19 (summarizing the scholarship in the area and broadly
outlining general themes of the attributes of educational experiences in preintegration Black schools); Adam Fairclough, The Costs of Brown: Black Teachers
and School Integration, 91 J. AM. HIST. 43 (2004) (summarizing the scholarship in
the area and exhaustively analyzing the benefits and challenges of pre-integration
Black schools); Sowell, supra note 223, at 6 (discussing a tradition of excellence at
Dunbar High School, an academically elite, all-Black public high school in
Washington, D.C.).
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memories of those educated in pre-integration Black schools, they
were cherished institutions whose educational mission was to
prevent Black children from internalizing societal attitudes about
their intellectual inferiority and to help them cultivate the skills
necessary for leading purposeful, meaningful lives even amidst Jim
Crow’s repression.228
But the legacy of pre-integration Black schools was obscured
by the Court’s stigma rationale. Although acknowledging the
“outstanding success in the arts and sciences as well as in the
business and professional world” of many Black Americans, the
Court did not explicitly attribute these successes to pre-integration
Black schools.229 The absence of historical context contributed to the
Court’s superficial analysis which assumed that all Black students
were monolithic, that they experienced segregation in the same
way, and that the dominant culture’s attitudes about Black
intellectual inferiority were always internalized by Black
students.230 Although some Black children certainly internalized
societal attitudes about their intellectual inferiority despite the
protective strategies devised by their teachers, 231 all of them did not
experience the psychological trauma that segregation was assumed
to elicit.232 And the existence of any psychologically-resilient Black
children233 amidst the repression of Jim Crow segregation is directly
attributable to the mission of pre-integration Black schools.234
When considered within the context of societal attitudes of Black
intellectual inferiority, the absence of historical context in Brown I
suggested that Black students “received little of educational value
228. Daye, supra note 162, at 97, 101–02 (discussing his favorable experiences at
a pre-integration Black school in North Carolina); Aiken, supra note 99, at 38
(describing pre-integration Black schools as institutions of support and refuge).
229. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483, 490 (1954).
230. Brown-Nagin, supra note 4, at 993–94.
231. Williams, supra note 120, at 189–90 (recalling personal angst about his
intellectual acumen as a high school student in Atlanta, Georgia, attending a
recently desegregated high school, but noting the variety of responses by Black
students in reaction to the external messages of Black intellectual inferiority implicit
in Jim Crow segregation).
232. Id. at 994.
233. IRONS, supra note 125, at 69 (discussing the results of Dr. Clark’s
psychological test and noting that five of the twelve children selected Black dolls
instead of White dolls).
234. See also Phoebe Weaver Williams, Segregation in Memphis, in LAW TOUCHED
OUR HEARTS, A GENERATION REMEMBERS BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 123, 129–
30 (Mildred Wigfall Robinson & Richard J. Bonnie, Eds., 2009) (describing efforts by
Black teachers to motivate students to learn and thus circumvent Jim Crow’s
narrative of inferiority).
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until they were desegregated into the superior [W]hite systems.” 235
Thus, the legacy of pre-integration Black schools as cherished
cultural institutions that anchored the lives of Black students
during segregation was obfuscated in the nation’s collective
memory.236 When viewed in its totality, Brown I replicated the
relational inequities of Jim Crow segregation by implicitly
endorsing an outsider narrative, obfuscating the legacy of preintegration Black schools, and facilitating the adoption of an
assimilationist model for school desegregation.
2. The Court’s Desegregation Jurisprudence Replicates
Relational Inequities and Undermines Integration
The relational inequities of Jim Crow segregation inherent in
Brown I’s transitional narrative guaranteed a weak transitional
framework for desegregation. The Warren Court’s strategy of
staking societal transformation on the sympathy of Whites in its
effort to redeem psychologically damaged Black children was a
weak foundation for societal transformation because it reinforced
the “outsider-insider” narrative at the root of White supremacy.
Brown I’s “outsider-insider” transitional narrative allowed, as
Sharon Rush observes, “[W]hite society to continue to function,
often subconsciously, on the myth of [W]hite superiority even as it
officially and consciously denounced the myth of [B]lack
inferiority.”237 In Brown II, the Court exacerbated the relational
inequities of Brown I’s transitional narrative by crafting a vague
remedial framework that left deeply entrenched attitudes about
Black intellectual inferiority unaddressed. The Court acknowledged
the complexities of fashioning a remedy for “reconciling public and
private needs” and recognized the importance of eliminating “a
variety of obstacles in making the transition to school systems
operated in accordance with the constitutional principles set forth
in [Brown I].”238 However, beyond the cryptic “all deliberate speed”
language, Brown II offered no practical guidance for the transition
and no precise methodology for dismantling institutionalized
attitudes of White supremacy that spawned ninety years of de jure
segregated schools.239 Under this laissez-faire approach to school
235. Siddle Walker I, supra note 225, at 1.
236. Id.; Fairclough, supra note 227, at 47.
237. Rush, supra note 212, at 92.
238. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955).
239. Turner, supra note 61, at 887–88 (summarizing scholarly criticism of
Brown II’s remedial framework).
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desegregation, it would take ten years before the Court
acknowledged the failures of Brown II’s remedial formula.240
However, its nascent desegregation jurisprudence would also
replicate the relational inequities of Jim Crow segregation. In Green
v. County School Board of New Kent County,241 the Court declared
its intent to eliminate the vestiges of de jure segregation “root and
branch.”242 However, its exclusive focus on six tangible factors of the
school environment such as student assignments, transportation,
and facilities as the lodestar of desegregation was at odds with the
intangible stigmatic injury of de jure segregation identified in
Brown I.243 This omission implicitly repudiated the stigma
rationale, implying that it was more legal abstraction than a
commitment to eliminating stereotypes of Black intellectual
inferiority at the root of de jure segregation.
Furthermore, once desegregation began in earnest, local
school boards implemented integration in ways that replicated the
relational inequities of Jim Crow by obfuscating the distinct
educational ethos of the pre-integration Black schools and the
cultural legacy of Black educators. The initial burst of enthusiasm
that some Black educators felt in the immediate aftermath of Brown
I244 would morph into the kind of skepticism that ultimately caused
legendary educator Dr. Horace Tate to believe that the Brown cases
promised only a “second-class citizenship.”245 This second class
citizenship would manifest itself in the closing of many preintegration Black schools246 and in the termination of thousands of

240. CASHIN, supra note 4, at 207 (noting the ten-year period of delay); see also
Kimberly Robinson, Resurrecting The Promise of Brown: Understanding and
Remedying How the Supreme Court Reconstitutionalized Segregated Schools, 88 N.C.
L. REV. 787, 805–06 (2010) (same).
241. Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd. of New Kent Cty., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
242. Id. at 438.
243. Id. at 435.
244. See Brown-Nagin, supra note 4, at 994, 998 (discussing the deep historical
roots of the ambivalence and hostility to Brown I by some in the Black community);
Fairclough, supra note 227, at 53 (extensively discussing the schism among Black
educators about the propriety of integration, but noting that most would publicly
endorse the NAACP’s attack on de jure desegregation).
245. VANESSA SIDDLE WALKER, THE LOST EDUCATION OF HORACE TATE:
UNCOVERING THE HIDDEN HEROES WHO FOUGHT FOR JUSTICE IN SCHOOLS 7 (1996)
[hereinafter Siddle Walker II]. Dr. Tate was the head of the 12,000 member Georgia
Teachers and Education Association, an influential organization in the educational
ethos of pre-integration Black schools. Id.
246. See, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 473 (1992) (noting that the Federal
District Court’s initial desegregation plan implemented in 1969 closed all of the
county’s pre-integration Black schools).
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Black educators.247 Historians estimate that between 1954 and
1972 more than 31,000 Black teachers lost their jobs and that a
staggering “96% of African-American principals lost their jobs in
North Carolina, 90% in Kentucky and Arkansas, 80% in Alabama,
78% in Virginia, and 77% in South Carolina and Tennessee.”248
Educators who avoided termination were often demoted or given
nominal positions.249 These terminations echoed Brown I’s
assimilationist narrative by perpetuating the paternalistic belief
that “closing [B]lack schools, terminating African-American
teachers, and demoting [B]lack principals . . . [were] reasonable
sacrifices to increase the quality of education for all students,
especially the [B]lack ones.”250 Some influential members of the
NAACP and the Black community expressed similar sentiments,
viewing the loss of Black educators as justified by the “onward
march of progress.”251
This myopic view of progress resulted in the kind of
deculturization that North Carolina Governor Luther Hodges and
other Southern governors used to thwart desegregation.252
However, the loss of a distinct educational aesthetic, culturally
sustaining educational spaces253 and a cohort of Black educators
was most precipitously borne by Black students. 254 During de jure
segregation, “public schools acted as agencies of race sentiment and
community identity.”255 The Black community “took ‘ownership’ of
schools . . . . These were not only places where students went to
learn; these were places that belonged to the community as a source
of pride, leadership, development, and acculturation.” 256 Ironically,
as Black educators were whittled from the ranks of what would
247. See WIGFALL ROBINSON & BONNIE, supra note 108, at 1; Fairclough, supra
note 227, at 53.
248. Brown, supra note 185, at 786 n.53 (citing historian Samuel Ethridge and
testimony from the United States Senate).
249. Fairclough, supra note 227, at 50.
250. Brown, supra note 185, at 786.
251. Fairclough, supra note 227, at 51.
252. See supra Section III.B; Southern Black Educators and Desegregation, CSPAN (July 31, 2018), http://www.c-span.org/video/?448954-1/southern-blackeducators-desegregation [https://perma.cc/XK9C-SSZ8] (discussing similar threats
made by Georgia Governor Eugene Talmadge).
253. See Fairclough, supra note 227, at 54 (observing that many pre-integration
Black schools that survived integration were converted into junior high schools and
in many states, “schools that had been named for [B]lack teachers or historical
figures were given new names”).
254. Daye, supra note 162, at 100–01; Culp, Jr., supra note 190, at 671.
255. Fairclough, supra note 227, at 48.
256. See Daye, supra note 162, at 102.
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become an increasingly White teaching cadre, 257 their distinct
cultural mission of empowerment would be lost in an
assimilationist educational model that “viewed [B]lack teachers as
inferior and [B]lack schools as ‘too [B]lack’ for [W]hite children.” 258
Fairclough notes that in the Black community “a strong sense of
providential mission promoted the belief that God had given
educated [B]lacks the duty of redeeming their race” and this
providential mission contributed to the belief among educators that
“[i]n the hands of the Negro teachers rests the destiny of the
race.”259 For Black teachers, the relational aspects of the pre-Brown
school environment—quasi-parental relationships with students
that included driving students to cultural events, helping them get
scholarships, understanding family dynamics, and providing food
and clothing when necessary—gave students the confidence to
advocate for themselves and their communities, preparing them for
the day when Black Americans would acquire the agency and
autonomy to assume their rightful role as valuable participants in
American democracy.260And consequently, Walker describes Black
educators as hidden provocateurs who defied the subversive intent
of Jim Crow by formulating and implementing educational policies
tailored for the unique needs of Black students and for the
liberatory goals of the Black community. 261 Given the civic ideals at
the heart of their professional identity, Black educators who
embraced integration did so with the hope that it would ensure
more equitable, agentic educational opportunities for Black
students and embody what Dr. King described as: “[Genuine]
integration . . . where there is shared power . . . not Negro
annihilation.”262 However, because integration obfuscated the
legacy of Black educators within a distinct educational ethos, Black
students did not receive a genuine integration but one that
“undermin[ed] the position of the [Black] teacher as a mentor, role
model, and disciplinarian.”263 And consequently, during the era of
257. KAILIN, supra note 184, at 43.
258. Culp, Jr., supra note 190, at 671.
259. Fairclough, supra note 227, at 49–50.
260. Southern Black Educators and Desegregation, supra note 252.
261. See id.; Weaver Williams, supra note 234, at 129–30 (describing efforts by
Black teachers to motivate students to learn and thus circumvent Jim Crow’s
narrative of inferiority).
262. Siddle Walker II, supra note 245, at 8 (discussing Dr. King’s remarks to
members of the Georgia Teachers and Education Association in 1967); Southern
Black Educators and Desegregation, supra note 252.
263. Fairclough, supra note 227, at 44; see also Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717,
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active enforcement of desegregation, the quid pro quo for the
“progress” of integration was the elimination of a distinct, Black
educational ethos and the cultural legacy of Black educators.
As the Court’s desegregation jurisprudence matured, it
continued to replicate the relational inequities of Jim Crow by
shifting its transitional narrative from one of paternalism and
assimilation to one of acquiescence and accommodation, resulting
in the resegregation of the nation’s schools and the abandonment of
integration as an educational policy. This narrative shift resulted
from the Court’s unwillingness to recognize that attitudes about
Black inferiority reflected in decades of government sanctioned
policies and manifesting themselves in new, more modern social
phenomena, such as White flight, housing discrimination, and
racially segregated housing patterns were vestiges of the
attitudinal remnants of de jure segregation. The Court’s
acquiescence to new, more modern manifestations of de jure
segregation began in Milliken v. Bradley,264 a case that civil rights
scholars characterize as the death knell for meaningful
desegregation.265 Milliken was the first case to comprehensively
address the constitutionality of remedial efforts to ameliorate the
reemergence of racially isolated schools amid shifting
demographics.266 The Court held that busing students between the
predominately White suburban Detroit school districts and the
predominately Black inner-city schools to redress de jure
segregation in Detroit exceeded Brown II’s remedial mandate.267
Although the record established that the State of Michigan and its
Board of Education facilitated the White flight that caused racially
identifiable suburban schools,268 the Milliken Court nevertheless
demanded additional evidence that jurisdictional boundaries were
725–26 (1974) (noting that findings of the district court that “with one
exception . . . defendant Board has never bused [W]hite children to predominantly
[B]lack schools. The Board has not bused [W]hite pupils to [B]lack schools despite
the enormous amounts of space available in inner-city schools”) (internal citations
and quotations omitted).
264. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
265. See, e.g., Laura McNeal, The Milliken Effect: Moral Exclusion Under the
Guise of Equity, 2015 HARV. J. ON RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. ONLINE, at 1, 4 (2015)
(characterizing the case as “a slow retreat from Brown’s promise of equality” and “as
the catalyst for the demise of school desegregation”); Turner, supra note 61, at 898–
99 (summarizing scholarly commentary on the case’s deleterious impact on the
success of integrated schooling in central cities); CASHIN, supra note 4, at 212 (same).
266. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 717.
267. Id. at 745–47.
268. Id. at 726–27.
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gerrymandered to thwart desegregation or that the suburban school
districts contributed to the de jure segregation of Detroit public
schools.269 By refusing to impute attitudes of Black inferiority
extant in the larger society and sanctioned by the State of Michigan
and its department of education onto suburban school districts
despite clear evidence of the segregative impact of those policies,
the Court repudiated the Warren Court’s stigma rationale. Unlike
the Warren Court that placed the blame of Black inferiority on local
school boards,270 Chief Justice Warren Burger absolved the
suburban schools districts, casting them as victims while ignoring
the stigmatic injuries of state-sanctioned policies of racial isolation
at the heart of the constitutional injury recognized in Brown I.271
The Court’s narrative shift toward acquiescence and
accommodation would intensify during the 1990s under the
leadership of Chief Justice William Rehnquist in a group of cases
described by scholars as the “resegregation trilogy.” 272 In Board of
Education of Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell,273 the Court
disregarded irrefutable evidence that the board’s neighborhood
school assignment policy would result in more than 50% of the city’s
schools becoming either predominantly Black or White. 274 Touting
the benefits of local control and disregarding decades of federal and
state sanctioned housing discrimination that facilitated racially
segregated neighborhoods, 275 the Court held that the relevant
inquiry for dissolving a desegregation decree was whether “the
vestiges of past discrimination had been eliminated to the extent
practicable,”276 reasoning that court ordered supervision was “not
intended to operate in perpetuity.”277 The last two cases in the

269. Id.
270. See Brown Commentators’ Roundtable, Day One, supra note 194.
271. See McNeal, supra note 265, at 17 (characterizing the Court’s interpretive
shift as transmitting “a symbolic and substantive message that the educational goal
of integrated learning environments was no longer a priority on a systematic level,
regardless of the documented harms of segregated learning environments”).
272. See, e.g., Turner, supra note 61, at 899.
273. Bd. of Educ. of the Oklahoma City Pub. Sch., Indep. Dist. No. 89 v. Dowell,
498 U.S. 237 (1991).
274. Id. at 237.
275. Id. at 251 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (remarking that board maintained
segregated schools for sixty-five years by “initially relying on laws requiring dual
school systems . . . [and] by exploiting residential segregation that had been created
by legally enforced restrictive covenants”).
276. Id. at 250.
277. Id. at 248.
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resegregation trilogy, Freeman v. Pitts278 and Missouri v. Jenkins,279
also involved the complexities of court ordered supervision amid
shifting racial demographics.280 In Freeman, shifting racial
demographics created predominantly White schools in the northern
area of the county and predominately Black schools in the southern
portion.281 In addressing the county’s shifting demographics, the
Court acknowledged the relationship between residential
segregation and school segregation,282 the historical record of “[p]ast
wrongs to the [B]lack race . . . committed by the State,” and the
existence of “stubborn facts of history [that] linger and persist.”283
But it nevertheless held that the county’s racially isolated schools
were not vestiges of de jure discrimination, reasoning that “though
we cannot escape our history, neither must we overstate its
consequences in fixing legal responsibilities.”284 However, the Court
did not explicitly address the county’s history of residential
segregation and blockbusting285 alluded to by the district court286 or
provide any historical justification for its conclusion about the
absence of a causal link between demographic changes and prior de
jure segregation. Notably, Justice Souter’s concurrence explored
alternate ways of establishing the causal connection that were
overlooked by the majority, observing that a causal link to de jure
segregation could be established based on “past school segregation
and the patterns of thinking that segregation creates.”287
The Court’s emphasis on the importance of local control amid
changing racial demographics was also reflected in Jenkins. The
desegregation plan at issue in that case sought to remedy the de
jure segregation in Kansas City public schools by requiring the
school board to engage in various initiatives designed not only to
improve educational opportunities within the district but to
278. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
279. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
280. Id. at 81; Freeman, 503 U.S. at 475, 477, 480.
281. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 476.
282. Id. at 471, 495.
283. Id. at 495.
284. Id. at 495–96.
285. Id. at 467. Blockbusting is a form of housing discrimination that was
outlawed by the Fair Housing Act of 1968 that encourages homeowners to sell their
property based on fears of an influx of minority residents. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e) (2018);
Jennifer Owens et al., Social Innovation Microgrants as Catalysts to Community
Development in Economically Marginalized Urban Communities, 18 U. MD. L.J.
RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 352, 357 (2018).
286. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 471, 480–81.
287. Id. at 507 (Souter, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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increase the overall attractiveness of Kansas City public schools to
White students enrolled in suburban school districts. 288 In
invalidating the board’s proactive pedagogical approach which
sought to equalize inner-city schools with their suburban
counterparts, the Court reasoned that educational initiatives to
increase the public schools’ “desegregative attractiveness” violated
the Milliken’s prohibition on inter-district segregation remedies to
redress vestiges of de jure segregation in a single district. 289
Additionally, according to scholar Kimberly Jenkins Robinson,
“[t]he Jenkins decision made clear that the Supreme Court would
not uphold efforts to make racially isolated schools equal by
improving the educational programming in segregated schools and
thus effectively abandoned even a return to Plessy’s ‘separate but
equal’ doctrine.”290
The collective impact of the Milliken decision and the
Rehnquist Court’s resegregation trilogy was twofold. First, it
replicated the relational inequities of Jim Crow by adopting a
specious distinction between de facto and de jure segregation that
ignored the causal link between de jure segregation and decades of
federal and state polices that sanctioned housing discrimination
and racially discriminatory lending practices that stripped Black
families of mobility and agentic educational opportunities available
to their White counterparts. As Lawrence observes, “[t]he injury of
segregation is found in its social meaning.” 291 The repudiation of
segregation means nothing if it results in the same social context at
the root of de jure segregation: a dichotomy between civil and social
equality resulting in a diminution of agency and reciprocity among
the targeted group that invites ridicule by the dominant society. 292
Furthermore, the Court’s impairment of Black families’
associational and mobility interests is premised on untenable
assumptions. The Court simply assumed that some degree of racial
isolation was permissible as the inevitable result of private choices
or societal discrimination, not the inevitable result of decades of
federal and state sanctioned racially-defined home lending
practices such as mortgage redlining, racially restrictive covenants,

288. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 74–78, 80 (1995).
289. Id. at 99–100.
290. Robinson, supra note 240, at 834.
291. Charles R. Lawrence, Unconscious Racism and the Conversation about the
Racial Achievement Gap, in IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW 113, 115 (Justin
Levinson & Robert J. Smith eds., 2012).
292. Murphy, supra note 12, at 131–32.
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blockbusting, and federal highway and urban renewal projects that
subsidized the development of White suburbs while erecting
highway infrastructure that displaced Black households and
separated White and Black neighborhoods.293 However, in Freeman,
the Court typically reached its conclusions about the absence of a
causal link between demographic changes and prior de jure
segregation without any comprehensive historical justification. In
commenting on the specious distinction between de jure and de facto
segregation, noted scholar Richard Rothstein observed that “State
action played not a minor, but the major role, more influential than
‘societal discrimination’ or ‘private choices.’ . . . [However,] [t]his
argument has rarely been forcefully presented to the courts, partly
because the history of state-sponsored segregation has been
forgotten, even suppressed.”294 The absence of a historical record
and the difficulties that it poses in school desegregation cases was
also acknowledged by Justice Anthony Kennedy who opined that
“[t]he distinction between government and private action . . . can be
amorphous both as a historical matter and as a matter of presentday finding of fact.”295 Rothstein’s and Justice Kennedy’s
observations are consistent with principles of transitional justice
that emphasize the importance of creating a historical record of past
government sanctioned wrongdoing and highlight the ways that
societal transformation can be thwarted by its absence.
Second, the Rehnquist Court’s resegregation trilogy led to the
demise of integration as an educational policy and to a system of
public education that is even more racially segregated than it was
in 1968.296 The isolation of Black students within a social context of
White resistance to desegregation and racial stereotypes evokes
“the story that segregation tells to [B]lack children and to the rest
of us . . . in its designation of a superior and an inferior caste.”297
293. See Richard Rothstein, The Myth of De Facto Segregation, PHI DELTA
KAPPAN, Feb. 2019, at 35, 35 (discussing the history of governmental action in
contributing to residential segregation); Jonathan Spader et al., Fostering Inclusion
in American Neighborhoods, in A SHARED FUTURE: FOSTERING COMMUNITIES OF
INCLUSION IN AN ERA OF INEQUALITY 22 (2018) (ebook).
294. Richard Rothstein, What Have We—De Facto Racial Isolation or De Jure
Segregation?, 40 HUM. RTS. MAG., no. 3, 2014, at 8–9.
295. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 795
(2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
296. IRONS, supra note 125, at xiii; Sam Erman & Gregory M. Walton, Stereotype
Threat and Antidiscrimination Law: Affirmative Steps to Promote Meritocracy and
Racial Equality in Education, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 307, 322–23 (2015); Rosiek, supra
note 4, at 8; Turner, supra note 61, at 902.
297. Lawrence, supra note 291, at 115.
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Many of the nation’s largest inner-city school districts are almost
without exception, non[W]hite and increasingly segregated.”298
Furthermore, according to a 2017 analysis by the UCLA Civil
Rights Project, “75[%] [B]lack students attend majority minority
schools, while 38[%] go to schools that are less than 10[%]
[W]hite.”299 One particularly ominous aspect of the reemergence of
racially-segregated schools is the correlation between de facto
school segregation and an overall decrease in the availability and
quality of resources accessible to racially segregated schools serving
predominately Black and Latinx students. 300 Racially-segregated,
overwhelmingly minority public schools “are characterized by
poorer test scores, less-experienced teachers, and fewer resources
than the public schools most [W]hite children attend.”301 In addition
to these aspects of the school environment, racially segregated
schools with high concentrations of minority students often have
fewer of the resources that are so vital to college and vocational
readiness, such as “college preparation curricula, higher-level
science and math courses, or guidance counselors.” 302 This
convergence of independent factors that result in decreased
educational opportunities for minority students in comparison with
their White peers is the functional equivalent of de jure segregation.
As constitutional law scholar Charles Daye so eloquently explains,
“[h]ow can equal protection not mean equality in fact? It takes a
lawyer to explain best how things can be legally equal but not equal
in any factual sense.”303 The Court’s narrow interpretation of its
remedial power ensured that the relational inequities of Jim Crow
would remain unaddressed and that the nation’s system of public
education would remain in a perennial state of transition.
Consequently, the subtle and not so subtle messages that continue
to exist about Black intellectual inferiority some sixty-five years
after Brown persist in the sub-text of our nation’s history, collective
memory, and system of public education.

298. WIGFALL ROBINSON & BONNIE, supra note 108, at 6.
299. See Berlatsky, supra note 185.
300. See Rosiek, supra note 4, 10–11.
301. CASHIN, supra note 4, at 202.
302. Thompson-Dudiak, supra note 98, at 188.
303. Daye, supra note 162, at 99 (emphasis in original).
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III. Jim Crow’s Ideology of Black Intellectual Inferiority
Haunts a New Generation: Stereotype Threat, Stigma
Threat, and the Soft Bigotry of Low Teacher
Expectations
Somebody told a lie one day. . . . They made everything Black,
ugly and evil.
—Martin Luther King, Jr.304

Dr. King’s quote alludes to the intransigence of attitudes about
Black inferiority that continues to resonate in the nation’s
consciousness. As demonstrated by the analysis in the preceding
section, stereotypes of Black intellectual inferiority were not
eradicated during the sociopolitical shift from segregation. Instead,
Brown I’s transitional narrative of paternalism and assimilation,
Brown II’s vague remedial framework, and the Court’s narrative
shift in the 1990s toward acquiescence and accommodation focused
on desegregation without striking at stereotypes of Black
intellectual inferiority at the root of segregation. Because of these
transitional deficiencies, integration did not remedy decades of
racially stereotypical thinking about the ability of Black students.
Dr. King’s vision of a genuine integration did not occur, and
consequently, many Black students find themselves in a doublebind: either marginalized and subordinated within predominately
White schools305 or isolated from their White peers without
culturally sustaining educational spaces or the protective strategies
for psychological resilience embodied in the legacy of preintegration Black schools. Professor Charles Lawrence poignantly
describes the double-bind that many modern-day Black students
experience:
Today, African American students live in a more confusing
world. They experience the slights, stereotypes, and exclusions
of racism, but civil rights laws have made racial discrimination
illegal, and most [W]hite Americans embrace the ideal of racial
equality. Yet, these laws have eliminated neither the structures
of racism nor the beliefs and practices that whisper stories of
inherent inferiority in young people’s ears.306
304. Phil Michael, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.—“I’m Black and Beautiful”,
YOUTUBE, (Nov. 2, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XNCSIWCyvTY [https
://perma.cc/33D4-KZHV].
305. DEGRUY, supra note 78, at 23; KAILIN, supra note 184, at 42.
306. Lawrence, supra note 291, at 126.
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Consistent with Lawrence’s observations, whispers of Black
intellectual inferiority manifest themselves in the modern-day
phenomena of stereotype and stigma threat. 307 Stereotype threat is
a well-documented educational phenomenon first articulated by
psychologists Claude Steele and Joshua Aronson. It explains how
pervasive negative intellectual stereotypes and a student’s
awareness of these stereotypes trigger anxiety, fear, and distraction
that negatively impact academic performance.308 According to
psychologists, children become aware of others’ stereotypes about
them between the ages of six and eleven, and thus “by early
adolescence, most children have developed knowledge of broadly
held stereotypes.”309 Although initially developed to explain
impaired performance among Black students in college testing
environments, researchers have determined that stereotype threat
can be observed in secondary education settings by any group
subject to pervasive stereotypes of low academic ability, and
triggered by any task capable of confirming a negative stereotype
about a group’s intellectual ability.310 These tasks include
performance on standardized tests and aspects of academic
engagement such as participating in classroom discussions,
interacting with peers, or pursuing post-secondary education
opportunities.311 Paradoxically, highly-motivated students who are
most invested in academics and whose academic engagement
should enhance their performance are most vulnerable to
stereotype threat.312 Stereotype threat “initiates a cascade of events
307. Racial stereotypes and biases also impact other aspects of the school
environment. See Oluwole & Green III, supra note 215, at 16–17, 21 (describing the
practice of tracking and ability grouping in secondary schools as “rooted in the beliefs
of minority inferiority and low intelligence that openly prevailed prior to and in the
early twentieth century and more subtly today”); Rosiek, supra note 4, at 10
(discussing racial segregation at the classroom level, especially in advanced
placement and international baccalaureate classes).
308. Erman & Walton, supra note 296, at 312.
309. Clark McKown & Michael J. Strambler, Developmental Antecedents and
Social and Academic Consequences of Stereotype-Consciousness in Middle
Childhood, 80 CHILD DEV. 1643, 1644, 1653 (2009).
310. Robin Nicole Johnson-Ahorlu, “Our Biggest Challenge Is Stereotypes”:
Understanding Stereotype Threat and the Academic Experiences of African American
Undergraduates, 82 J. NEGRO EDUC. 382, 383 (2013).
311. Id.
312. Jonathan Feingold, Racing Towards Color-Blindness: Stereotype Threat and
the Myth of Meritocracy, 3 GEO. J.L. & MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 231, 240 (2011);
Jason W. Osborne & Christopher Walker, Stereotype Threat, Identification with
Academics, and Withdrawal from School: Why the Most Successful Students of
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leading to a self-fulfilling prophecy” that has life-altering academic
consequences.313 For example, some of “[t]he most rigorous
estimates suggest that stereotype threat accounts for a substantial
proportion of racial achievement gaps.”314
Stigma threat is another equally pernicious, but lesser known
way that the nation’s schools remain plagued by the attitudinal
remnants of Jim Crow segregation. In stark contrast to stereotype
threat, stigma threat is the external manifestation of negative
racial stereotypes in the school environment.315 If unchecked,
stigma threat results in racially hostile educational environments
where Black students and other racial minorities affected by
stereotypes of intellectual deficiency feel isolated and unwelcome.316
Implicit racial bias among teachers, another feature of racially
hostile educational environments, “is one of the biggest barriers to
closing the achievement gap between [W]hite children and students
of color, particularly those who come from low-income homes.”317
Noted author Verna Myers defines implicit bias as “the stories we
make up about people before we know who they actually are” 318 and
the term broadly encompasses “the attitudes or stereotypes that
affect our understanding, actions, and decisions in an unconscious
manner.”319 Americans of every race have implicit biases that can
be exacerbated by the absence of racially and culturally diverse life
experiences.320 Demographic data about the paucity of interracial
social interactions, the intransigence of attitudes about Black
intellectual inferiority, and the shifting racial demographics of the
nation’s public schools reveal a system of public education that is
conducive to implicit bias.321 According to one survey, “75[%] of
Colour Might Be Most Likely to Withdraw, 26 EDUC. PSYCHOL. 563, 563, 566–67
(2006).
313. McKown & Strambler, supra note 309, at 1646.
314. Erman & Walton, supra note 296, at 313.
315. Stacy L. Hawkins, Mismatched or Counted Out? What’s Missing from
Mismatch Theory and Why It Matters, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 855, 874 (2015).
316. Id.
317. How to Promote Diversity in the Classroom: Recognize and Challenge Implicit
Bias, WATERFORD.ORG (June 28, 2019), https://www.waterford.org/education/implici
t-bias-in-education/ [https://perma.cc/5ADD-EW3E].
318. See Shane Safir, 5 Keys to Challenging Implicit Bias, GEORGE LUCAS EDUC.
FOUND. (Mar. 14, 2016), http://www.edutopia.org/blog/keys-to-challenging-implicitbias-shane-safir [https://perma.cc/3HMT-3GN8].
319. See Understanding Implicit Bias, OHIO ST. U.: KIRWAN INST. FOR STUDY
RACE & ETHNICITY (2015), http://kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/research/understandingimplicit-bias/ [https://perma.cc/6WHS-CF4P].
320. See How to Promote Diversity in the Classroom, supra note 317.
321. See id.
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[W]hite Americans have entirely [W]hite social networks[—]an
experience that results in exaggerated perceptions of difference as
well as fear and threat.”322 Furthermore, a study conducted during
the era of the Rehnquist Court revealed that 53% of Whites believed
that Blacks were not as intelligent, and another study conducted
during the same period revealed that “37[%] of White Americans
professed that African Americans are incapable of being motivated
to learn.”323 Paradoxically, although these statistics substantiate
the social isolation and existence of attitudinal remnants of Jim
Crow segregation among Whites, interracial teacher-student
contact is the norm in American public schools. 324 According to
statistics from the National Education Association (NEA), “the
overall number of non-White students has surpassed 50[%] while
White teachers still account for 84[%] of the teaching force in the
public school system.”325 Given these statistics, it follows that some
White teachers harbor racial biases that result in the “distorted
mental frameworks imposed by segregation . . . [that cause them] to
see members of other racial and ethnic groups as images consistent
with past ideologies of imposed superiority and oppression rather
than as authentic individuals.”326
Implicit bias among White teachers is often manifested in
what one scholar describes as the “[s]oft [b]igotry of [l]ow
[e]xpectations.”327 In a policy pronouncement encouraging teacher
training programs to adopt culturally responsive pedagogical
practices, the NEA observed that “non-Black teachers have
significantly lower expectations of Black students . . . [that] can
unknowingly lead a teacher to change their instructional strategies
and/or select resources that do not challenge or develop Black
students’ cognitive or analytical skills.”328 This finding is
particularly troubling because empirical research reveals that high
teacher expectations are inextricably linked to academic success

322. See Safir, supra note 318.
323. Oluwole & Green III, supra note 215, at 21–22.
324. Arthur L. Whaley, Advances in Stereotype Threat Research on African
Americans: Continuing Challenges to the Validity of its Role in the Achievement Gap,
21 SOC. PSYCHOL. EDUC. 111, 129 (2018).
325. NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N, CONFRONTING IMPLICIT BIAS THROUGH EXEMPLARY
EDUCATOR PREPARATION 1 (2018), http://www.nea.org/assets/docs/23840%20Confro
nting%20Implicit%20Bias%20Thru%20Exemp%20Teacher%20Prep-v2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E9HY-5SS4].
326. Foehrenbach Brown, supra note 10, at 221.
327. Hawkins, supra note 315, at 893–94.
328. NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N, supra note 325, at 2.
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among Black students329 and that students perform in ways that
are consistent with their teacher’s expectations. 330 The deleterious
impact of implicit bias embodied in these statistics was also
reflected in a 2014 study documenting the effects of racial
stereotypes on collegiate teacher-student relationships.331
According to that study, Black students “have higher mistrust of
teachers than [W]hite students based on the pervasive stigma of
[B]lack intellectual inferiority . . . [that can] trigger a ‘socialcognitive barrier . . . that obscures the meaning of constructive
feedback and prevents students from learning from it.’”332 These
findings highlighting the importance of trust in teacher-student
relationships were substantiated by a 2017 research study which
found that a caring attitude “is the dimension of student-professor
interactions responsible for positive academic self-concept among
African American college students.”333 Acclaimed educator Theresa
Perry emphasizes the importance of teachers in affirming Black
students’ identification with schooling and intellectual work, noting
that:
[A] child’s belief in the power and importance of schooling and
intellectual work can be interrupted by teachers . . . who
explicitly or subtly convey a disbelief in the child’s ability for
high academic achievement, and the child having a rightful
place in the larger society—unless a counternarrative about the
child’s identity as an intellectual being is intentionally passed
on to him or her.334

Ironically, the counternarrative that Perry references—the
cornerstone of the educational ethos of pre-integration Black
schools and the legacy of its Black educators—was obfuscated as the
quid pro quo for the progress of integration and by the adoption of
an assimilationist model for school desegregation. 335 Given this

329. Hawkins, supra note 315, at 875, 893–94; Whaley, supra note 324, at 128–
29.
330. Hawkins, supra note 315, at 896.
331. Id. at 899 (quoting findings from a research study published in 2014).
332. Id. at 898–99 (quoting findings from a research study published in 2014).
333. Whaley, supra note 324, at 129.
334. THERESA PERRY ET AL., YOUNG, GIFTED, AND BLACK: PROMOTING HIGH
ACHIEVEMENT AMONG AFRICAN-AMERICAN STUDENTS 79 (2003).
335. See supra Section II.B.2; see generally Anthony L. Brown, Counter-Memory
and Race: An Examination of African American Scholars’ Challenges to Early
Twentieth Century K-12 Historical Discourses, 79 J. NEGRO EDUC. 54 (2010)
(comprehensively discussing the use of curriculum writing by early twentieth
century Black scholars to challenge narratives of inferiority).
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assimilationist model, public schools are a function of White
dominant culture.336 And thus Perry contends that “most of our
educational institutions continue to institutionalize ‘[W]hiteness’ as
the culture of power.”337 An institutionalized culture of Whiteness,
according to Perry, means that Black students who do not mimic
the “subset of those cultural features that represent ‘[W]hiteness’ in
the American imagination” will lack cultural capital, the socially
inherited
cultural
competence
necessary
for
academic
achievement.338 These cultural features include a reserved
demeanor and the ability to subordinate emotion to reason,
constrain physical activity, and present a disciplined exterior.339
Because Black children without cultural capital manifest
characteristics that are at odds with the dominant culture, these
differences can trigger differential treatment which may stem from
implicit biases about Black intellectual inferiority. Furthermore,
without the protective strategies for psychological resilience at the
heart of pre-integration Black schools being reinforced by teachers
with culturally informed approaches to pedagogy, Black students
are at risk for not developing psychological buffers that thwart the
detrimental impact of teacher-student interactions tainted by
implicit bias.

336. See Molefi Kete Asante, The Afrocentric Idea in Education, 60 J. NEGRO
EDUC. 170, 174 (1991) (“[A] ‘Whites-only’ orientation has predominated in education.”
) (emphasis added); see also Danielle N. Boaz, Equality Does Not Mean Conformity:
Reevaluating the Use of Segregated Schools to Create a Culturally Appropriate
Education for African American Children, 7 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 8–10 (2007)
(discussing the Eurocentric focus of American education where “African Americans
are only taught to identify their ancestors as slaves, and they learn nothing of the
cultures of the tribes from which these slaves descended”).
337. PERRY ET AL., supra note 334, at 74.
338. Id. at 75.
339. Id.
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IV. Moving Toward Attitudinal Transformation: A
Preliminary Framework for Acknowledging the Legacy
and Dangers of Racial Stereotyping in American
Education
History, despite its wrenching pain, cannot be unlived, but if
faced with courage, need not be lived again.
—Maya Angelou340

The enduring truth of Maya Angelou’s exhortation—
acknowledging the injuries caused by the attitudinal remnants of
Jim Crow segregation so that they “need not be lived again”—is the
equitable mandate of transitional justice. However, the Roberts
Court seems unlikely to rectify the transitional deficiencies at the
root of the Court’s desegregation jurisprudence given its 2007 ruling
in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District
No. 1341 that invalidated voluntary attempts by school districts to
create racially-integrated schools. This decision signaled the
Court’s continued ambivalence to the attitudinal remnants of Jim
Crow segregation that has resulted in the reemergence of
segregated public schools.342 Consequently, the Court’s
unwillingness to acknowledge the relationship between present-day
issues of educational inequality and the attitudinal remnants of Jim
Crow segregation will likely continue. Absent a radical,
transformative paradigmatic shift from the Court—a literal Brown
2.0—the Federal Government’s reliance on the rule of law as the
exclusive vehicle for eradicating the attitudinal remnants of Jim
Crow segregation will continue to perpetuate attitudes of Black
intellectual inferiority at the root of contemporary issues of
educational inequality.
However, several recent high-profile reconciliatory initiatives
reflect the public’s increasing interest in transitional justice
practices and its willingness to engage in a national dialogue about
the relationship between present-day issues of racial inequality and
the legacy of slavery and Jim Crow. Headlines about reparations
have dominated news cycles, reinvigorating discussion about an
issue that failed to generate any traction when it entered the

340. BOSTON BUSING/DESEGREGATION PROJECT, supra note 96, at 28.
341. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 551
U.S. 701 (2007).
342. Robinson, supra note 240, at 839.
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national dialogue during the early and mid-2000s343 amid the wave
of non-federally endorsed transitional justice inspired initiatives
outlined in Part II. 2020 Democratic presidential candidates
Kamala Harris, Elizabeth Warren, Julián Castro, and Marianne
Williamson captured national attention by openly discussing the
issue of reparations in their campaigns. 344 Fueled by discourse
about the possibility of restitution to the descendants of slaves,
Congress held its first hearing on reparations in more than a decade
on June 19, 2019, a day of cultural significance in the Black
community.345 This hearing was the culmination of twenty-eight
years of legislative activism by former Congressman John Conyers,
urging Congress to convene a commission to study “subsequent de
jure and de facto racial and economic discrimination against
African-Americans, and the impact of these forces on living AfricanAmericans.”346 But the most dramatic example of the public’s
increasing interest in paradigmatic transitional justice practices is
the nationally publicized reparations program initiated by
Georgetown University students in April 2019, benefitting the
descendants of slaves who were sold in 1838 to pay the University’s
debts.347 The students’ demand for reparations is the most recent
reconciliatory effort in a larger campaign to force the University to
acknowledge its complicity in perpetuating slavery that includes
1960s-style sit-ins and a demand that the administration rename
buildings bearing the names of men who orchestrated the sale of
slaves.348 Prominent private sector institutions have also garnered
public attention with their efforts to acknowledge the relationship
between present-day issues of racial inequality and the legacy of
slavery and Jim Crow. In August 2019, The New York Times
343. See We Don’t Want Dollars, supra note 58, at 25–29 (briefly summarizing the
quest for reparations in the United States).
344. See P.R. Lockhart, The 2020 Democratic Primary Debate over Reparations,
Explained, VOX (June 19, 2019, 9:37 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-andpolitics/2019/3/11/18246741/reparations-democrats-2020-inequality-warren-harriscast [https://perma.cc/DCH8-JJX2].
345. June 19th is commonly referred to as “Juneteenth,” a holiday
commemorating the date when slaves in Texas learned about the end of slavery. See
Debate About Reparations, supra note 63.
346. Commission to Study and Develop Reparation Proposals for AfricanAmericans Act, H.R. 40, 116th Cong. (2019); see Owens, supra note 63; see also
Debate About Reparations, supra note 63 (noting that after Congressman Conyers’s
retirement, Congressman Sheila Jackson Lee sponsored the bill).
347. See Lardieri, supra note 66.
348. See Andre Perry, Voting for Reparations, One Institution at a Time,
HECHINGER REP. (Apr. 23, 2019), https://hechingerreport.org/voting-for-reparationsone-institution-at-a-time/ [https://perma.cc/5ZRX-ZYH4].
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launched The 1619 Project, a reference to the year that slaves first
arrived in the Americas, with a special 100-page edition of its
Sunday magazine.349 The 1619 Project is ambitious in that it argues
1619 to be our true founding and “aims to reframe the country’s
history by placing the consequences of slavery and the contributions
of [B]lack Americans at the very center of our national narrative.”350
The public’s increasing interest in and awareness of
transitional justice practices can be leveraged by education
reformers to create a preliminary framework of reconciliatory
initiatives that could lead to federally endorsed reconciliatory
initiatives acknowledging the intergenerational impact of nine
decades of school segregation. This preliminary framework should
foster three levels of consciousness that roughly correspond to the
transitional deficiencies of the Court’s desegregation jurisprudence:
(1) acknowledging attitudes of Black inferiority and White
supremacy at the root of de jure segregation (historical
consciousness), (2) recognizing the cultural and educational legacy
of pre-integration Black schools that was obfuscated in the
transition from segregation (cultural consciousness), and (3)
connecting attitudinal remnants of de jure segregation to presentday educational inequalities such as stereotype and stigma threats
(stereotype consciousness).
Historical consciousness requires reconciliatory initiatives
that create national awareness about forgotten aspects of school
desegregation, that present a more comprehensive, inclusive
version of that history, and that document the causal connection
between the attitudinal remnants of Jim Crow segregation and
contemporary issues of educational inequality. Museums, such as
the National Museum of African American History and Culture, the
National Memorial for Peace and Justice, and the Emmett Till
Interpretive Center,351 could become exemplars for commemorative
spaces that begin the process of societal transformation by
acknowledging the psychological trauma experienced by children of
all races during the desegregation of the nation’s schools and the
intergenerational impact of that psychological trauma. For
example, community advocates working in conjunction with federal
agencies such as the National Park Service, national organizations
349. Nikole Hanah-Jones et al., The 1619 Project, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 18, 2019.
350. See Jake Silverstein, Why We Published The 1619 Project, N.Y. TIMES MAG.
(Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/12/20/magazine/1619intro.html [https://perma.cc/DTS7-F8BX].
351. See supra Part II.
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such as the Alliance of African American Museums, and
international organizations such as the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 352
could form a coalition to commemorate historic sites related to the
Prince Edward Free School Association, the federally-funded
educational initiative launched in 1963 by the Kennedy
Administration in the wake of the massive resistance to school
desegregation that closed all of the public schools in Prince Edward
County, Virginia for five years.353 The Association was “the first
federal school set up since the Civil War in the South” and was “‘a
model school system for educationally deprived children,’ open to all
students regardless of color and funded by private donations.”354
Generating public awareness about this important chapter in the
history of school desegregation that has been largely obscured in the
nation’s collective memory355 could also lead to truth-telling
initiatives chronicling the lives of the Black students who were
educated in Association schools and documenting the
intergenerational impact of the lost educational opportunities on an
entire generation of Black students in Prince Edward County,
Virginia.
These kinds of truth-telling initiatives could also become the
impetus for documentary films similar to BBDP’s Can We Talk?—
Learning from Boston’s Busing/Desegregation Crisis, which could
be funded by grassroots community activists, private foundations
such as the Andrus Family Fund, whose mission is to empower
352. With the launching of its Slave Route Project, UNESCO has demonstrated
an interest in preserving culturally significant memorial spaces. See Slave Route,
UNESCO, http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/slaveroute/spotlight/preservation-of-memorial-sites-and-places/ [https://perma.cc/FTQ7MLD3].
353. See Emanuel Riley, The Prince Edward County Free School Association,
REDISCOVERING BLACK HIST. (May 19, 2015), http://rediscovering-black-history.blog
s.archives.gov/2015/05/19/prince-edward-county-free-school-assoc/ [https://perma.cc
/KR7L-456Q].
354. The Story of Prince Edward County Schools—Prince Edward County Schools
Handout, PBS: NEWSHOUR (2014), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/extra/app/uploads
/2014/04/Prince-Edward-County-School-Handout.pdf [https://perma.cc/67B28YWQ].
355. See, e.g., Kristen Green, Prince Edward County’s Long Shadow of
Segregation, ATLANTIC (Aug. 1, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive
/2015/08/segregation-prince-edward-county/400256// [https://perma.cc/ZS49-7JDV]
(documenting the intergenerational impact of the five-year school closure and
observing that “[d]ecades later, the impact of those years of missed education can
still be felt through the county’s 16[%] illiteracy rate, four points higher than the
state average, and 20[%] of the population lives below the poverty level. And the
once-closed school district is now a failing system”).
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young people of color to community activism, 356 or federal agencies
such as the National Endowment for the Arts that provides funding
“to sustain artistic traditions of culturally-distinct communities and
promote the vitality of those traditions.” 357 These kinds of films
have the potential to reach a larger audience and to facilitate truthtelling initiatives in other areas of the country that examine the
intergenerational impact of similar educational deprivations that
occurred during the decade-long period of overt and often violent
massive resistance to school desegregation. Another equally
important aspect of historical consciousness is creating a historical
record that establishes a causal connection between the attitudinal
remnants of Jim Crow segregation and contemporary issues of
educational inequality. The same spirit of inquiry that resulted in
Congressional hearings on reparations could be leveraged to
petition Congress to conduct a similar inquiry into the causal link
between decades of federal, state, and local policies sanctioning
housing discrimination and racially discriminatory lending
practices that was obfuscated by the Rehnquist Court’s specious
distinction between de jure and de facto segregation, one that led to
the reemergence of contemporary de facto segregated schools.
Although closely related to historical consciousness, culturally
conscious transitional justice practices would focus on educating the
nation about the distinct Black educational ethos that was
obfuscated by an assimilationist model for school desegregation. For
example, grassroots community organizers, in conjunction with
state and local school boards, could petition Congress to pass a bill
funding the preservation of significant cultural and historical sites
related to the legacy of pre-integration Black schools. Culturally
conscious reconciliatory initiatives should also include the lobbying
of state and local school boards, state legislatures, and private
education stakeholders such as the NEA for the adoption of a more
356. See Who We Empower, ANDRUS FAM. FUND, http://affund.org/our-focus/
[https://perma.cc/8LQ9-K4A7]. The fund has awarded grants to several communitybased organizations that raise awareness of modern-day issues of educational equity
such as the School Justice Project which provides advocacy services to “ensure that
older, court-involved students with disabilities can access a quality education.” See
Our Mission, SCHOOL JUST. PROJECT, http://www.sjpdc.org/ [https://perma.cc/8VMZNR7G]. Another grantee, Race Forward, engages in “systemic analysis and an
innovative approach to complex race issues to help people take effective action
toward racial equity.” See About Race Forward, RACE FORWARD,
http://www.raceforward.org/about [https://perma.cc/M5W3-3G7K].
357. NEA National Heritage Fellows: Fact Sheet, NAT’L ENDOWMENT FOR ARTS,
http://www.arts.gov/sites/default/files/Heritage-Fellows-FactSheet-June2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7MM7-HCEV].
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culturally inclusive public school curriculum to redress the cultural
and psychological injuries resulting from the adoption of an
assimilationist model for school desegregation. This culturally
inclusive curriculum should depict a more comprehensive view of
the role of Black Americans in American history, not limited to
slavery and civil rights, but exploring the cultures and tribes of
Africa from which these African-Americans descended. This history
should be integrated throughout the school year and taught in a
way that presents it as an ongoing narrative of agency,
empowerment, and resilience, not stigma, victimization, or cultural
deprivation. Curriculum standards developed by states, such as
Mississippi358 and Illinois,359 requiring that every public elementary
school and high school incorporate civil and human rights education
into its curriculum, could be used as exemplars for the development
of national curricular standards.
Lastly, stereotype conscious reconciliatory initiatives should
direct national attention to the attitudinal remnants of Jim Crow
segregation that manifest themselves in stereotype threat, stigma
threat, and implicit bias. In May 2019, New York City Schools
Chancellor Richard Carranza made national headlines when he
announced that the city would invest approximately $20 million in
mandatory
anti-bias
training
programs
for
teachers,
administrators, and staff.360 School districts in cities, such as Long
Beach, California and Cleveland, Ohio, have launched similar antibias initiatives.361 Coordinated efforts between private advocacy
organizations, such as the NEA and the National Alliance of Black
School Educators, the Department of Education, and its Office for
Civil Rights, could capitalize on these local efforts by developing a
national set of standards that would link anti-bias training to
accreditation and licensing for teacher education programs.
Furthermore, anti-bias training should be supplemented with some
of the historically and culturally conscious transitional practices

358. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 37-13-191 to -195 (West 2019).
359. 122 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/27-20.4 (2019).
360. See Alex Zimmerman & Reema Amin, NYC’s Anti-Bias Training for
Educators Is Contentious—And Behind Schedule. Some Advocates Say That’s Not a
Bad Thing., CHALKBEAT (May 31, 2019), http://www.chalkbeat.org/posts/ny/2019/05
/31/nycs-anti-bias-training-for-educators-is-contentious-and-behind-schedule-someadvocates-say-thats-not-a-bad-thing/ [https://perma.cc/5A2Y-8YPG].
361. Sarah Schwartz, Next Step in Diversity Training: Teachers Learn to Face
Their Unconscious Biases, EDUC. WK. (May 14, 2019), https://www.edweek.org/ew/a
rticles/2019/05/15/next-step-in-diversity-training-teachers-learn.html [https://perm
a.cc/LR4M-WCQU].
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previously referenced so that teachers are “informed about the
history of racism in schools and various creative forms that
resistance to racism has taken.”362
Stereotype conscious reconciliatory initiatives should also
include educating students, parents, and the nation about how
stereotypes of Black intellectual inferiority perpetuate pervasive
structural inequalities in the nation’s public schools by putting
Black and White students on unequal footing in educational
environments that purport to be a meritocracy: the belief at the
foundation of American education that academic success is not a
function of race or social class, 363 but “a matter of motivation and
talent and grit.”364 As previously discussed, stereotypes and implicit
biases can be exacerbated by the absence of racially and culturally
diverse life experiences and educational environments.
Demographic data substantiating the re-emergence of de facto
racially segregated schools suggests that students would benefit
from age-appropriate anti-bias and implicit bias training.
Furthermore, education reformers could also create stereotype
conscious reconciliatory initiatives that engage students via the
innovative use of films, storytelling, and interactive media. Several
cable television networks have begun the process of generating
public attention about how stereotypes of Black inferiority rooted in
Jim Crow segregation manifest themselves in the nation’s public
schools. These could serve as exemplars for stereotype conscious
transitional justice practices. For example, in 2018, the STARZ
network debuted America to Me, a ten-part docu-series that
poignantly depicts how the attitudinal remnants of Jim Crow
segregation manifest themselves in racial divides, stereotypes of
Black intellectual inferiority, and the implicit biases of wellmeaning teachers at a suburban Chicago high school that is touted
as a model of successful school integration. 365 Wyatt Cenac’s
Problem Areas, an HBO series that explores polarizing topics in
contemporary American life, devoted its second season to exploring
362. Rosiek, supra note 4, at 12.
363. See How to Promote Diversity in the Classroom, supra note 317; see also
Maureen T. Hallinan, Sociological Perspectives on Black-White Inequalities in
American Schooling, 74 SOC. EDU. 50, 50 (2001).
364. Melinda D. Anderson, Why the Myth of Meritocracy Hurts Kids of Color,
ATLANTIC (July 27, 2017), http://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2017/07/int
ernalizing-the-myth-of-meritocracy/535035/ [https://perma.cc/QWS3-Z36T].
365. See Aisha Harris, ‘America to Me’: What Did the Students Think?, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 28, 2018), http://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/28/arts/television/america-to-mestudents-starz.html [https://perma.cc/RUA3-6GVH].
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inequities in the United States’ public education system, including
the intransigence of stereotypes of Black intellectual inferiority.366
These kinds of films could also lead to cross-racial healing
initiatives between school districts. For example, school districts
with large numbers of racially segregated schools could partner
with racially diverse school districts or predominately White school
districts to launch cross-racial healing initiatives akin to The
Welcome Table initiatives highlighted in Part II. These moderated
cross-racial student dialogues could also become the impetus for the
innovative use of storytelling, interactive media, and the visual arts
to challenge students to create self-produced documentaries and
podcasts to tell their individual stories and to document the stories
of others in their school communities.
Conclusion
Though deeply flawed, Brown I’s enduring legacy is its
character as a transitional legal rule that “remains a pivotal
moment in the struggle for racial justice,” triggering a “movement
that overturned Jim Crow in the South and sparked a
revolution . . . that transformed America’s social and political
landscape.”367 However, a society and system of public education in
perennial transition dishonor Brown I’s equitable imperative as a
transitional legal rule “to face our past squarely, commit the
resources necessary to changing the deplorable inequalities of the
present, and embrace an underlying commitment to substantive
equality.”368 Furthermore, the Federal Government should
demonstrate an undaunted commitment to eradicating stereotypes
of intellectual inferiority at the root of Jim Crow segregation that is
not premised on altruism or paternalism toward Black Americans
but on strengthening democracy so that it lives up to its egalitarian
and liberalizing ideals. In his dissent to Milliken v. Bradley, Justice
Marshall argued that “unless our children begin to learn together,
there is little hope that our people will ever learn to live together.”369
Marshall’s argument invokes the inherently political aspect of

366. See Anne Branigin, We’ve Been Talking About Education All Wrong. Wyatt
Cenac Wants to Change That, ROOT (Apr. 5, 2019, 3:00 PM), http://thegrapevine.the
root.com/weve-been-talking-about-education-all-wrong-wyatt-cena-1833823984
[https://perma.cc/F5YG-HAD2].
367. Turner, supra note 61, at 909–10 (quoting ROBERT L. CARTER, A MATTER OF
LAW: A MEMOIR OF STRUGGLE IN THE CAUSE OF EQUAL RIGHTS 242 (2005)).
368. See BOSTON BUSING/DESEGREGATION PROJECT, supra note 96.
369. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 783 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Brown I that is often obscured in contemporary discussions: the
threat that de jure segregation and its ideology of Black inferiority
poses to democratic ideals and to the primary function of public
education as preparing students of all races to be good citizens. 370
Consequently, as scholar Jerry Rosiek argues so persuasively,
unaddressed stereotypes and attitudes of Black intellectual
inferiority are detrimental to the well-being of all students:
[T]hese tacit curricular messages [of inferiority] affect students
of all races . . . cast into doubt the familiar story, often taught
in schools, of steady progress toward racial justice . . . [but]
[p]erhaps most problematically, they normalize racial
segregation for all students in these schools and make it easier
to accept it in other parts of their lives.371

If students of all races begin to accept racial segregation as a
normalized part of United States’ schools and society, societal
transformation will remain elusive, facilitating what Canadian
scholars Frances Henry and Carol Tator describe as democratic
racism that “further[s] the interests, and increase[es] the power, of
the dominant group while maintaining a veneer of democracy.” 372 A
veneer of democracy perpetuates a Plessy-like dichotomy between
legal and social equality and creates a separatist world that poses
the same threat to authentic democracy as it did in 1954.

370. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
371. Rosiek, supra note 4, at 11.
372. Emil Marmol, The Undemocratic Effects and Underlying Racism of
Standardized Testing in the United States, CRITICAL INTERSECTIONS EDUC., Winter
2016, at 2.

